Professionalism  as Pathology: The ABA\u27s Latest Pollicy Debate on Nonlawyer Ownership of Law Practice Entities by Schneyer, Ted
Fordham Urban Law Journal
Volume 40
Number 1 The Law: Business of Profession? The
Continuing Relevance of Julius Henry Cohen for the
Practice of Law in the Twenty-First Century
Article 15
March 2016
"Professionalism" as Pathology: The ABA's Latest
Pollicy Debate on Nonlawyer Ownership of Law
Practice Entities
Ted Schneyer
University of Arizona James E. Rogers College of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj
Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility
Commons, and the Legal Profession Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Fordham Urban Law Journal by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more
information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ted Schneyer, "Professionalism" as Pathology: The ABA's Latest Pollicy Debate on Nonlawyer Ownership of Law Practice Entities, 40
Fordham Urb. L.J. 76 (2012).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj/vol40/iss1/15
SCHNEYER_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE) 4/15/2013 5:46 PM 
 
75 
“PROFESSIONALISM” AS PATHOLOGY:  
THE ABA’S LATEST POLICY DEBATE ON 
NONLAWYER OWNERSHIP OF LAW 
PRACTICE ENTITIES 
Ted Schneyer* 
Introduction ............................................................................................... 76 
  I.  The Formation and Elaboration of the Idiom of 
Professionalism ............................................................................... 87 
A. Julius Henry Cohen’s Early Articulation of Key 
Elements ................................................................................... 87 
B. The Bar’s Treatment of Lawyers’ Business 
Entanglements from Cohen’s Time to ABA Adoption 
of the Model Rules in 1983 .................................................... 94 
1. In-house Counsel ............................................................... 94 
2. Bar Rules and Policies on Lawyers’ Business 
Entanglements that the Supreme Court Struck 
Down in the 1960s and 1970s ........................................... 95 
a. Defending the Ban on Lawyer Participation in 
Group Legal Services Plans ....................................... 96 
b. The Bar’s Defense of Minimum Fee Schedules ...... 99 
c. The Bar’s Defense of the Ban on Lawyer 
Advertising ................................................................ 101 
C. The ABA’s Pre-20/20 Debates on Whether the Model 
Rules Should Permit Nonlawyer Ownership of Law 
Practice Entities and Lawyer or Law Firm Ownership 
of “Ancillary Businesses” ..................................................... 102 
1. The Kutak Commission’s ALPS Proposal ................... 102 
2. Rejection of Proposals to Permit Lawyers to 
Practice in MDPs ............................................................. 105 
3. The Ancillary Business Debate ..................................... 110 
i. The Precautionary Principle .................................... 115 
ii. A Preoccupation with Motive ................................. 116 
iii. No Sense of Duty to Support Their Opposition 
to Lawyer or Law Firm Ownership of Ancillary 
Businesses with Available Evidence ....................... 117 
SCHNEYER_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE) 4/15/2013  5:46 PM 
76 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XL 
  II.  A Critique of the Idiom-Based Arguments the Opponents 
of Nonlawyer Ownership Made to the 20/20 Commission ...... 118 
A. Six Elements of the Idiom of Professionalism That 
Are Salient in the Opponents’ Arguments Against 
Nonlawyer Ownership .......................................................... 120 
B. A Critique of the Opponents’ Idiom-Based 
Arguments Against the Working Group’s Proposal ......... 123 
1. Proponents of Nonlawyer Ownership Must Bear 
the “Burden of Proof” .................................................... 123 
2. A Biasing and Selective Approach to the Use of 
Empirical Evidence ......................................................... 124 
3. The Imperative to Ban Nonlawyer Ownership 
Categorically Rather than Permitting but 
Regulating a Modest Form of Nonlawyer 
Ownership ........................................................................ 127 
4. The Slippery Slope Theory ............................................. 129 
5. Unsubstantiated Concerns that Nonlawyer 
Ownership Will “Compromise Core Values” .............. 130 
6. Any Suggestion that Allowing Law Firms to Have 
Nonlawyer Owners Might Promote Competition in 
the Legal Services Market Is Out of Bounds ............... 133 
  III.  Two Problems with Continuing to Treat the Idiom of 
Professionalism as the “Official Language” for the Bar’s 
Policy Debates on the Rules that Should Govern Lawyers’ 
Business Entanglements .............................................................. 134 
Conclusion ................................................................................................ 137 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In August 2009, then-ABA President Carolyn Lamm established 
the ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20 to review the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct (Model Rules), to consider whether changes 
were called for in light of the “globalization” of law practice and rapid 
developments in law-practice technology, and to make appropriate 
recommendations to the ABA House of Delegates.1  In May 2012, the 
 
* Milton O. Riepe Professor of Law Emeritus, University of Arizona James E. 
Rogers College of Law.  This Article draws on my work since Fall 2009 as a member 
of the ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20.  Thanks to Carolyn Lamm for appointing 
me; to Commission Co-Chairs Jamie Gorelick and Michael Traynor; to the other 
commissioners, liaisons, reporters, and counsel, from whom I learned much; and to 
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Commission submitted for consideration by the ABA House of 
Delegates proposed changes in the Model Rules and their 
accompanying Comments on six topics,2 and on August 6, 2012 the 
House adopted all six proposals.3  This Article concerns a proposal 
the Commission decided not to submit to the House. 
To facilitate its work, the Commission formed seven working 
groups consisting of commission members and representatives from 
the ABA and other bar entities.  Each group was to study a particular 
subject and develop recommendations.4  One of the subjects was 
 
all those at the ABA Center for Professional Responsibility for making things run so 
smoothly.  My pleasure in working with these colleagues more than offsets my real 
disappointment in learning that, in the face of enormous changes in law practice and 
its regulation in the United States and elsewhere, much of the American bar 
apparently remains strongly opposed even to experimentation with a highly restricted 
form of nonlawyer ownership of law firms. Thanks also to Michele DeStefano for her 
comments on an early draft of this Article. 
 1. See James Podgers, Firm Hand for Firm Times, A.B.A. J., Aug. 2009, at 63, 
63–64.  President Lamm also indicated that the Commission should take account of 
changes in federal regulation, U.S. trade agreements, and changes in how other 
countries regulate lawyers. Id.  The project was prompted by the perception that 
changes in these domains, and in the legal services market generally, are 
transforming law practice in ways the profession could not anticipate in 2002, the 
year of the last major overhaul of the Model Rules. See ABA COMM’N ON ETHICS 
20/20, ABA COMMISSION ON ETHICS 20/20 INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 1–2 
(2012), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ 
ethics_2020/20120508_ethics_20_20_final_hod_introdution_and_overview_report.aut
hcheckdam.pdf.  For a description of the Commission’s work and process, see id. at 
2–3.  For information about Commission members, see About Us, A.B.A., 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/aba_commission_on_
ethics_20_20/about_us.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2013). 
 2. See ABA Adopts Policy on Ethics in the Profession, Criminal Justice 
Reforms and Civil Standards in Immigration Detention, ABA NOW (Aug. 7, 2012), 
http://www.abanow.org/2012/08/aba-adopts-policy-on-ethics-in-the-profession.  The 
six Resolutions adopted (designated 105A-F) concern, respectively: law practice 
technology and confidentiality, technology and client development, ethical 
implications of outsourcing legal work, the detection of conflicts of interest when 
lawyers move from one firm to another, law practice pending bar admission, and bar 
admission by motion. See Work Product, A.B.A., http://www.americanbar.org/ 
groups/professional_responsibility/aba_commission_on_ethics_20_20/work_product.h
tml (last visited Feb. 1, 2013). 
 3. See Work Product, A.B.A., http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_ 
responsibility/aba_commission_on_ethics_20_20/work_product.html (last visited Feb. 
1, 2013).  The Commission concluded its work in February 2013, when it proposed 
and the House adopted changes on four additional topics. See Leigh Jones, ABA 
Ethics Commission Closes Chapter on Rule Revisions, NAT’L L.J. (Feb. 14, 2013), 
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202588381157&ABA_ 
ethics_commission_closes_chapter_on_rule_revisions&slreturn=20130309134731. 
 4. See ABA COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20, supra note 1, at 3 n.9. 
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Alternative Law Practice Structures (ALPS),5 which are for-profit 
entities in which lawyers practice law but which, unlike traditional law 
firms, are owned at least in part by nonlawyers.  I served as a 
commission member and as co-chair of the ALPS Working Group.6  
Our primary task was to consider whether the Model Rules should be 
amended to permit lawyers to practice law in ALPS. 
For decades, American lawyers have been barred from (1) sharing 
legal fees with nonlawyers, (2) forming a partnership with nonlawyers 
if any of its activities constitute the practice of law, and (3) practicing 
law in a firm that is authorized to do so for profit, if a nonlawyer is a 
director or officer of the firm or has the right to direct or control a 
lawyer’s exercise of professional judgment.7  Today, Rule 5.4 of the 
ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, and analogous rules in 
every U.S. jurisdiction except the District of Columbia, continue to 
proscribe these activities.8  But recent regulatory reforms abroad, 
most notably in Australia and the United Kingdom (U.K.), permit 
lawyers, under certain conditions, to practice in firms that have 
nonlawyer-owners.  With those developments in mind, the key issue 
the ALPS Working Group was asked to consider was whether ALPS 
 
 5. Id.  This group was initially called the Working Group on Alternative 
Business Structures (ABS), the more common term, especially abroad.  The name 
change was cosmetic, the word “business” apparently being seen as pejorative.  The 
other working groups were asked to address issues related to: new technologies; 
outsourcing; conflicts of interest, uniformity, and choice of law; alternative litigation 
financing; law firm ratings and rankings; and inbound foreign lawyers. 
 6. Other members of the ALPS Working Group were George W. Jones (Co-
Chair and Commissioner); Jeffrey Golden (Commissioner); Roberta Cooper Ramo 
(Commissioner); Professor Carole Silver (Commissioner); Chief Justice Gerald W. 
VanderWalle (Commissioner); Donald B. Hilliker (ABA Center for Professional 
Responsibility); Kathleen J. Hopkins (ABA General Practice, Solo and Small-Firm 
Division); George Ripplinger (ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional 
Responsibility); Wallace E. “Gene” Shipp, Jr. (National Organization of Bar 
Counsel); and Robert D. Welden (ABA Standing Committee on Professional 
Discipline).  Professor Paul D. Paton served as the Working Group’s Reporter, with 
the participation of Professor Andrew Perlman, the Commission Reporter.  Ellyn S. 
Rosen from the ABA Center for Professional Responsibility served as Commission 
Counsel and Art Garwin, Deputy Director of the Center, also provided counsel. 
 7. These bans were originally added to the ABA’s first ethics code, THE CANONS 
OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, in 1928. See CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS Canons 33–35 
(1963). 
 8. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4(a)–(b), (d) (2009).  For the 
District of Columbia version of Rule 5.4, which has permitted a limited form of 
nonlawyer ownership since 1991, see infra note 15.  For brief descriptions of the rules 
banning nonlawyer ownership in a sampling of U.S. jurisdictions, see STEPHEN 
GILLERS ET AL., REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDS 346–49 
(2012). 
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could operate in a manner consistent with the “core values” of the 
American legal profession.9 
The Working Group studied the history of ABA policy on 
nonlawyer ownership, as well as the experience with ALPS in the 
District of Columbia and abroad.  It identified five kinds of ALPS, all 
of which are now permissible in the United Kingdom and Australia.10  
They are (1) law firms11 wholly or partly owned by passive investors 
(e.g., a department store chain); (2) law firms that raise capital by 
issuing stock to outsiders; (3) multidisciplinary practices (MDPs), i.e., 
firms that have lawyer- and nonlawyer-owners who are all active in 
firm operations, with the nonlawyers providing nonlegal services to 
their own clients; (4) law firms owned in part by nonlawyers whose 
role is limited to helping firm lawyers provide legal services; and (5) 
law firms owned in part by nonlawyers whose role is limited as in 
alternative 4, but with further restrictions.12 
By June 2011, the Commission had rejected the first three 
alternatives13 without looking closely at the novel measures the 
 
 9. See ABA COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20, PRELIMINARY ISSUES OUTLINE 6 (2009), 
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/ 
ethics_2020/preliminary_issues_outline.authcheckdam.pdf.  The American legal 
profession has no official set of “core values,” but competence, confidentiality, 
loyalty, independent professional judgment, preserving professional “self-
regulation,” and promoting access to justice are often cited. See, e.g., MDP 
Recommendation—Center for Professional Responsibility, A.B.A., 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/commission_multidisc
iplinary_practice/mdprecom10f.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2013) (offering a similar list). 
 10. For the Working Group’s summary of the key regulatory changes that now 
permit nonlawyer ownership in Australia and the U.K., see ABA Commission on 
Ethics 20/20 Working Group on Alternative Business Structures, Issues Paper 
Concerning Alternative Business Practices 7–10, 13–15 (Apr. 5, 2011) (unpublished 
manuscript) [hereinafter ALPS Issues Paper], available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/abs_issues_
paper.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 11. In this Article the term “law firms” refers to private entities that provide only 
legal services. 
 12. ALPS Issues Paper, supra note 10, at 17–19. 
 13. See ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20 Will Not Propose Changes to ABA 
Policy Prohibiting Nonlawyer Ownership of Law Firms, ABA NOW (Apr. 16, 2012), 
http://www.abanow.org/2012/04/aba-commission-on-ethics-2020-will-not-propose-
changes-to-aba-policy-prohibiting-nonlawyer-ownership-of-law-firms/ [hereinafter 
No Change in ABA Policy on Nonlawyer Ownership].  This was not surprising 
because these are the alternatives that differ most radically from traditional law 
firms.  Moreover, as recently as 2000, the House of Delegates had not only rejected a 
proposal to permit lawyers to practice in MDPs, but more broadly resolved that the 
“sharing of legal fees with nonlawyers and the ownership and control of the practice 
of law by nonlawyers are inconsistent with the core values of the legal profession.” 
MDP Recommendation—Center for Professional Responsibility, supra note 9.  Like 
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British and Australian authorities were taking to prevent nonlawyer-
owners from interfering with the lawyers’ exercise of professional 
judgment or otherwise putting core values at undue risk.14  But, the 
Commission did ask the ALPS Working Group to draft for further 
consideration a version of Rule 5.4 that would follow the District of 
Columbia model,15 but with two further restrictions: a percentage cap 
 
the Founding Fathers, the House held this truth to be self-evident.  But the House 
resolution had potential implications for all five alternatives; it could be read to treat 
each “core value” as an absolute, brooking no compromise.  On that reading, no 
proposal to permit nonlawyer ownership, however limited, which might pose even a 
slight risk of compromising a single “core value” could ever pass muster—even if it 
might substantially benefit clients and the public in other respects and some bar 
constituencies supported it. 
 14. However, the Working Group did inform the Commission about these 
measures. See ALPS Issues Paper, supra note 10, at 7–10, 13–15.  And the 
Commission received information from British and Australian authorities about the 
controls built into the Legal Services Act of 2007 and implementing regulations. See 
Letter from Chris Kenney, Chief Executive of the Legal Services Board, to Stephen 
N. Zack, ABA President (May 27, 2011), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/ethics_20_2
0_comments/kenny_issuespaperconcerningalternativebusinessstructures.authcheckda
m.pdf; Letter from Charles Plant, Chair of the Bd. of the Solicitors Regulation Auth., 
to Foreign Bars and Regulators (June 27, 2011) (on file with author); Statement by 
John Wooton, President of the Law Soc’y of Eng. & Wales, to the ABA Comm’n on 
Ethics 20/20 (August 5, 2011) (on file with author); see also Michele DeStefano, 
Nonlawyers Influencing Lawyers: Too Many Cooks in the Kitchen or Stone Soup?, 
80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2791, 2816–17 & nn.141–45 (2012) (concluding that the controls 
in place in Australia and the U.K. demonstrate that regulators there are mindful of 
the importance of protecting core values). 
 15. See D.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4 (2007).  That rule, like the ABA 
rule is captioned “Professional Independence of a Lawyer,” and provides in pertinent 
part that: 
(a) A lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer, except 
that: 
. . . . 
  (4) Sharing of fees is permitted in a partnership or other form of 
organization which meets the requirements of paragraph (b) . . . . 
. . . . 
(b) A lawyer may practice in a partnership or other form of organization in 
which a financial interest is held or managerial authority is exercised by an 
individual nonlawyer who performs professional services which assist the 
organization in providing legal services to clients, but only if: 
  (1) The partnership or organization has as its sole purpose providing legal 
services to clients; 
  (2) All persons having such managerial authority or holding a financial 
interest undertake to abide by these Rules of Professional Conduct; 
  (3) The lawyers who have a financial interest or managerial authority in 
the partnership or organization undertake to be responsible for the 
nonlawyer participants [i.e, owners] to the same extent as if nonlawyer 
participants were lawyers under Rule 5.1; [and] 
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on nonlawyer ownership in order to maintain lawyer control, and a 
requirement that the law partners conduct a character inquiry to 
assess the capacity of prospective nonlawyer-owners to act in a 
manner compatible with the lawyers’ duties.16  The Working Group 
produced a Draft Resolution meeting these criteria, and a supporting 
Draft Report, which, in December 2011, the Commission circulated 
together as a Discussion Paper for comment.17 
 
  (4) The foregoing conditions are set forth in writing. 
Id. 
 16. See James Podgers, Summer Job: Ethics 20/20 Commission Shelves 
Nonlawyer Ownership, Focuses on Other Proposals, A.B.A. J., June 2012, at 27, 27. 
 17. The Draft Resolution called for amending Model Rule 5.4(a), which currently 
provides (with minor exceptions, irrelevant to ALPS) that a “lawyer or law firm shall 
not share legal fees with a nonlawyer.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4(a) 
(2012).  The Resolution would have created a new exception allowing such fee 
sharing “pursuant to [a new] paragraph (b).”  Under new paragraph (b), a lawyer 
“may practice in a law firm in which individual nonlawyers . . . hold a financial 
interest,” but only if 
(1) the firm’s sole purpose is providing legal services to clients; 
(2) the nonlawyers provide services that assist the lawyer or law firm in 
providing legal services to clients; 
(3) the nonlawyers state in writing that they have read and understand the 
Rules of Professional Conduct and agree in writing to undertake to conform 
their conduct to the Rules; 
(4) the lawyer partners in the law firm are responsible for those nonlawyers 
to the same extent as if the nonlawyers were partners under Rule 5.1; 
(5) the nonlawyers have no power to direct or control the professional 
judgment of a lawyer, and the financial and voting interests in the firm of 
any nonlawyer are less than the financial and voting interest of the 
individual lawyer or lawyers holding the greatest financial and voting 
interest in the firm; the aggregate of the financial and voting interests of the 
lawyers does not exceed [25%] of the firm total, and the aggregate of the 
financial and voting interests of all lawyers in the firm is equal to or greater 
than the percentage of voting interests required to take any action or for 
any approval; 
(6) the lawyer partners in the firm make reasonable efforts to establish that 
each nonlawyer with a financial interest in the firm is of good character, 
supported by evidence of the nonlawyer’s integrity and professionalism in 
the practice of his or her profession, trade, or occupation, and maintain 
records of such inquiry and its results; and 
(7) compliance with the foregoing conditions is set forth in writing. 
ABA Comm’n on Ethics 20/20, Discussion Draft for Comment Alternative Law 
Practice Structures, app. at 1–2 (Dec. 2, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) [hereinafter 
ALPS Draft Resolution], available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/ 
aba/administrative/ethics_2020/20111202-ethics2020-discussion_draft-alps.authcheck 
dam.pdf.  The Resolution also proposed ten new comments to Rule 5.4. See id. app. 
at 2–4.  Readers interested in the data and other information the Working Group and 
staff collected in studying ALPS may wish to consult the accompanying report. Id. at 
4–16. 
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Altogether, the Commission received more than thirty written 
submissions on the ALPS issue, chiefly comments responding to the 
Working Group’s Discussion Paper or earlier Issues Paper.18  The 
Commission also took testimony at public hearings.19  This input 
included some support for the Draft Resolution20 and some criticism 
that it did not go far enough in liberalizing Model Rule 5.4.21  But 
overall, the response was extremely negative, and categorically so; 
opponents wanted the Model Rules to continue to bar lawyers from 
practicing law in any firm owned in any form and to any degree by 
nonlawyers.22  In their view, the substantial measures to protect core 
values that were built into the Draft Resolution did not distinguish it 
 
 18. See Alternative Law Practice Structures Comments Chart, A.B.A., 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/alps_workin
g_group_comments_chart.authcheckdam.pdf (last updated Aug. 28, 2012) 
[hereinafter ALPS Comments Chart].  Of the comments listed, the large majority 
came from bar groups or lawyers—four from other ABA entities, four from state bar 
associations, and fifteen from individual lawyers or groups of lawyers.  Some of the 
comments in opposition to nonlawyer ownership are analyzed infra Part III. 
 19. See, e.g., Joan C. Rogers, Ethics 20/20 Commission Remains Divided on 
Letting Nonlawyers Buy into Law Firms, 28 Law. Manual Prof’l Conduct 
(ABA/BNA) 100 (Feb. 15, 2012) (reporting on comments made at a Commission 
hearing by New York State Bar Association President Vincent E. Doyle III and 
Lawrence J. Fox, an attorney at Drinker Biddle Reath in Philadelphia and longtime 
leader in ABA ethics debates).  In a few cases, the Commission received more than 
one response from the same party. 
 20. See, e.g., Letter from Tracey L. Young & Robert S. Horuda, President & Vice 
President, Nat’l Fed’n of Paralegal Ass’ns, to ABA Comm’n on Ethics 20/20 (Jan. 27, 
2012), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ 
ethics_2020/ethics_20_20_comments/nationalfederationparalegalassociations_alpsdis
cussiondraft.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 21. Professor Tom Morgan, a longtime expert on the regulation of law practice, 
submitted extensive comments arguing that in view of the rapidly changing nature of 
law practice, the Working Group’s Draft Resolution would permit too little non-
lawyer ownership. See Letter from Thomas D. Morgan, Oppenheim Professor of 
Antitrust & Trade Regulation Law, The George Washington Univ. Law Sch., to 
ABA Comm’n on Ethics 20/20 (Jan. 30, 2012), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/ethics_20_2
0_comments/morgan_alpsdiscussiondraft.authcheckdam.pdf; see also Letter from 
Thomas M. Gordon, Legal & Policy Dir., Consumers for a Responsive Legal Sys., to 
ABA Comm’n on Ethics 20/20 (Jan. 30, 2012), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/ethics_20_2
0_comments/responsivelaw_alpsdiscussiondraft.authcheckdam.pdf (calling it 
unfortunate that the Commission was rejecting MDPs as well as “the more open 
approach to non-lawyer participation now practiced in the United Kingdom and 
Australia”). 
 22. See infra Part III (analyzing many of the negative comments). 
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from earlier and more radical proposals to permit lawyers to practice 
in MDPs or law firms owned by outside investors.23 
In the wake of this response, the Commission decided not to 
recommend to the House any change in the Model Rules that would 
permit lawyers to practice law in firms with nonlawyer owners.  On 
April 16, 2012, Commission Co-Chairs Jamie Gorelick and Michael 
Traynor issued a press release announcing the decision.24  Gorelick 
told the ABA Journal that the Commission made its decision “on the 
merits,” and she and Traynor “indicated that the feedback [received] 
from other bar associations and individual members of the profession 
did not suggest a groundswell of support for revising the ABA Model 
Rules . . . to permit a limited form of nonlawyer ownership.”25  The 
first statement is a matter of interpretation.  And the two statements, 
taken together, suggest that, for the Commission, deciding against 
recommending the Draft Resolution on the “merits” meant heeding 
the profession’s predominately negative attitude toward all forms of 
nonlawyer ownership of law practices.26 
 
 23. See infra Part III.B. 
 24. ABA NOW, supra note 13.  I supported the ALPS Working Group’s Draft 
Resolution and hoped the Commission would recommend it to the House even 
though it was unlikely to be adopted.  In my view, the ABA’s public responsibility as 
a rule maker for the practice of law cut in favor of having the delegates consider the 
matter and articulate their positions.  But with only limited information available on 
the experience with similar rules in the District of Columbia and the United 
Kingdom, cf. infra Part III, it proved very difficult to convince skeptics that clients 
and lawyers could benefit substantially if the ABA and state supreme courts adopted 
such a hedged proposal.  I do not fault other commissioners for thinking at that point 
that the game was not worth the candle.  Commissioners more savvy than I about 
ABA politics worried that the House would not only reject the proposal without 
productive debate, but would also become less supportive of worthy Commission 
proposals on other matters. 
 25. Podgers, supra note 16, at 27 (emphasis added).  As of August 2012, however, 
the Commission had not ruled out preparing an informational White Paper on 
nonlawyer ownership to submit to the House, and it was still considering whether to 
propose choice-of-law rules for determining the propriety of fee-sharing 
arrangements between lawyers practicing in a jurisdiction that forbids sharing legal 
fees with nonlawyers, on one hand, and law firms with nonlawyer-owners in the 
District of Columbia and in foreign countries where nonlawyer ownership is 
permitted. See id. at 28.  The Commission ultimately decided against the White Paper 
and the choice-of-law proposal. 
 26. This is not to say that the Commission heard only from lawyers and bar 
associations.  It invited public comment on the Discussion Paper but received a 
disappointing response from outside the profession. See ALPS Comments Chart, 
supra note 18 (citing a list of comments and commentators compiled by the 
Commission staff).  By contrast, the ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice, 
in the short period between November 1998 and August 1999, heard testimony and 
received submissions on whether to permit lawyers to practice in MDPs from more 
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The nature of that negative reaction is revealed in the remarkably 
uniform rhetoric that opponents used to express their opposition.  
The opponents’ rhetoric, rather than the merits of the Resolution, is 
the subject of this Article, which describes and criticizes that rhetoric.  
More broadly, it places the rhetoric in historical context by reviewing 
ABA and state bar policy and policymaking over time not only on the 
issue of nonlawyer ownership, but also on other issues concerning 
what Gary Munneke usefully called “business entanglements with 
nonlawyers.”27  And it suggests that the predominant bar discourse on 
“entanglement” issues over time reflects troubling weaknesses in bar 
policymaking and, consequently, in our system of “professional self-
regulation,” in which the mainstream bar and the state supreme 
courts, working in tandem, choose the ethics rules that govern law 
practice. 
My historical review reveals constant reliance over time on 
virtually the same rhetorical tools that the opponents of the ALPS 
Draft Resolution used in expressing their views to the 20/20 
Commission.  I call those tools, collectively, the “idiom of 
professionalism.”28  This Article identifies and criticizes the main 
features of the idiom as it has evolved to date.  It also shows that 
although the idiom has often won the day in internal ABA policy 
 
than ninety parties with a much broader range of backgrounds. See Appendix B: 
Witnesses at ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice Hearings, A.B.A., 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/commission_multidisc
iplinary_practice/mdpappendixb.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2013).  Of course, that 
commission dealt solely with MDP issues.  The 20/20 Commission had a much 
broader charge and could only devote limited attention to ALPS. 
 27. See Gary A. Munneke, Dances with Nonlawyers: A New Perspective on Law 
Firm Diversification, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 559, 576 (1992).  I recognize that for many 
readers “business entanglements with nonlawyers” is an unfamiliar, even awkward 
phrase.  In some cases, one could just as well speak of “the business aspects of law 
practice.”  But the arrangements I claim the bar has treated as business 
entanglements often concern forms of collaboration between lawyers and nonlawyers 
that many people might not think of as involving the business aspects of law practice. 
 28. I first used the term “idiom of professionalism” in criticizing the rhetoric that 
proponents used to convince the ABA House of Delegates in 1991 to adopt a Model 
Rule that barred lawyers and law firms from owning and operating “ancillary 
businesses.” Ted Schneyer, Policymaking and the Perils of Professionalism: The 
ABA’s Ancillary Business Debate as a Case Study, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 363, 365–67, 
372–90 (1993).  The ancillary business debate is discussed infra Part II.C.3.  Russell 
Pearce has used the term “ideology of professionalism” in much the same way as I 
use the term “idiom of professionalism.” See Russell G. Pearce, Law Day 2050: Post-
Professionalism, Moral Leadership, and the Law as Business Paradigm, 27 FLA. ST. 
U. L. REV. 9, 16 (1999).  But I prefer the word “idiom” because it connotes a form of 
discourse that has hardened into a stable, recurrent pattern. 
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debates, those victories have become vulnerable to subsequent legal 
attack in external forums.  Based on that analysis, this Article 
questions the capacity of idiom-based arguments to promote sound 
and stable policies on issues concerning lawyers’ “business 
entanglements with nonlawyers.”29 
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I lays a foundation for a 
critical review of the rhetoric lawyers and bar entities used in 
opposing the Working Group’s Draft Resolution on nonlawyer 
ownership.  It traces the development and deployment of the idiom of 
professionalism from the early twentieth century to date. 
Part I.A considers Julius Henry Cohen’s early contributions to the 
idiom in his classic work on legal ethics, The Law: Business or 
Profession?30  Part I.B describes the use and elaboration of the idiom 
between 1920 and 1980, both in ABA policy debates concerning the 
rules that should govern lawyers’ business entanglements and, more 
recently, in the bar’s advocacy when defending such rules against 
legal challenges after the rules were adopted.  In addition to 
nonlawyer ownership of entities in which lawyers practice law, the 
“entanglements” I discuss include working for businesses as in-house 
counsel, providing legal services through group legal services plans, 
advertising for clients, and charging clients less for legal services than 
bar-issued minimum fee schedules prescribe.  Part I.C documents the 
further use and hardening of the idiom in three ABA debates in the 
Model Rules era, debates that set the stage for the 20/20 
Commission’s consideration of ALPS.  Two of those debates also 
 
 29. Because the ABA is a private association with no authority to make legally 
binding rules, one might consider this topic unimportant.  But even though ABA 
ethics rules become positive law only if adopted by courts and agencies, the ABA, by 
dint of its influence, is the principal lawgiver in the regime lawyers call “professional 
self-regulation.”  For example, by 1972, only two years after the ABA issued its Code 
of Professional Responsibility, most state supreme courts had adopted it, often 
verbatim, to govern lawyers in their jurisdictions. See Report of the ABA Special 
Commission to Secure Adoption of the Code of Professional Responsibility, 97 
A.B.A. REP. 268 (1972).  Today, the high court in every state but California has 
adopted the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, albeit with local amendments.  
With such influence, the ABA’s rulemaking deserves close scrutiny.  The ABA itself 
has acknowledged this as early as 1919, when it resolved to develop its policy 
recommendations in the manner expected of a “quasi-public association.” See 
CORINNE GILB, HIDDEN HIERARCHIES: THE PROFESSIONS AND GOVERNMENT 216 
(1966).  I believe that ABA policymaking in the realm of legal ethics is especially 
“affected with a public interest.” 
 30. JULIUS HENRY COHEN, THE LAW: BUSINESS OR PROFESSION? (2d ed. 1924).  
The book was first published in 1916, but citations in this Article are to the 1924 
edition, which included a lengthy postscript updating developments. 
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concerned whether to permit lawyers to practice law in ALPS.  The 
third concerned whether to bar lawyers from owning or operating 
firms that provide “nonlegal services which are ancillary to the 
practice of law” and from practicing law in firms that own or operate 
“ancillary businesses.”31 
From the historical material in Part I, Part II distills six elements of 
the idiom of professionalism.  Part II shows that those elements were 
salient in the comments the 20/20 Commission received from lawyers 
and bar entities that opposed the Working Group’s recommendation 
of a modest relaxation of the ban on lawyers practicing in ALPS.  
And it criticizes the opponents’ deployment of those elements in their 
comments. 
While Parts I and II identify and criticize various idiom-based 
arguments, Part III offers a more general statement of the 
overarching problems I associate with the repeated invocation of such 
arguments—and little else—in two settings: one internal to the bar, 
the other external.  Internally, bar constituents make idiom-based 
arguments in an effort to win the day for their preferred outcomes in 
ABA debates concerning the rules that should govern the business 
aspects of law practice.32  Externally, the bar recycles those arguments 
to defend idiom-based bar rules and policies when they are later 
challenged in legal forums in which the bar does not have what Bruce 
Green has called the bar’s “enormous home field advantage.”33 
The internal problem is that the constant resort to idiom-based 
arguments in bar debates on the rules that should govern lawyers’ 
business entanglements tends to forestall serious efforts to assess the 
specific risks and benefits of the entanglements at issue.  The external 
problem stems from the fact that ABA rulemaking on lawyers’ 
business entanglements has often produced categorical bans that are 
grounded in idiom-based rather than evidence-based arguments. 
 
 31. See Schneyer, supra note 28, at 364. 
 32. I have not found this pattern in evidence in the policymaking process that 
resulted in authorizing lawyers in England and Wales to practice law in a broad range 
of ALPS. See Legal Services Act 2007, c. 29 (U.K.).  The executive and legislative 
branches of the British government established and controlled that process, but 
engaged in painstaking studies of the legal services market and sought and received 
substantial input from the British legal profession(s).  Of course, the very different 
process that led to that result may have drawbacks of its own, an issue requiring 
comparative analysis beyond the scope of this Article. 
 33. Bruce A. Green, The Disciplinary Restrictions on Multidisciplinary Practice: 
Their Derivation, Their Development, and Some Implications for the Core Values 
Debate, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1115, 1156 (2000). 
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Those bans have proven in recent decades to be highly vulnerable to 
legal challenge, as evidenced by the Supreme Court decisions striking 
down bans on lawyer advertising34 and declaring that bar-issued 
minimum fee schedules unlawfully restrain trade.35  These external 
“interventions” put in question the ABA’s legitimacy as the principal 
ethics rule-maker for law practice.  Whether the same fate will befall 
the ABA’s categorical ban on all nonlawyer ownership of law practice 
entities remains to be seen, but recent developments suggest that the 
risk is far from negligible and that the ABA should be focusing more 
on how to regulate nonlawyer ownership than on preserving the ban.36 
My experience on the 20/20 Commission leads me to think these 
problems deserve more attention from bar leaders than they have 
received.  For if reliance on “professionalism” as a mantra in bar 
policymaking on the business aspects of law practice continues 
unabated, the upshot for the American legal profession in a time of 
dramatic changes in law practice and its regulation might well be to 
diminish the ABA’s influence as a “private legislature” for law 
practice, and further erode what was once the primacy of professional 
self-regulation in the governance of law practice.  These 
consequences would be deeply ironic because preserving the bar’s 
privilege of self-regulation is one of the core values the idiom of 
professionalism treats as sacrosanct. 
I.  THE FORMATION AND ELABORATION OF THE IDIOM OF 
PROFESSIONALISM 
A. Julius Henry Cohen’s Early Articulation of Key Elements 
Julius Henry Cohen’s The Law: Business or Profession? was the 
first systematic attempt in the United States to define the elements of 
lawyer professionalism and consider what they entail for law practice 
and the regulatory mission of the bar. 
The book is organized around two fundamental ideas.  The first is 
Cohen’s insistence on drawing in the starkest terms the distinction 
between “profession” and “business.”  He was not satisfied to treat 
the two concepts as ideal types at the poles of a continuum, for that 
 
 34. See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977); infra notes 91–95 and 
accompanying text. 
 35. See Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975); infra notes 89–90 and 
accompanying text. 
 36. The ban is now coming under legal attack. See infra notes 224–25 and 
accompanying text. 
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would suggest that real lawyers and businessmen were hybrids, 
occupying somewhat different but largely overlapping positions along 
the continuum.  Instead, he treated the distinction as a dichotomy 
based on a fundamental difference in motivation.  For Cohen, to be a 
professional was to be motivated by an ethic of service in fulfilling a 
vital social function; to be in business was to be motivated by profits.37  
This is clear from his approving quotation of a passage from R.H. 
Tawney’s The Acquisitive Society,38 which Cohen wished “could be 
put in the hands of every law student.”39  “A Profession,” Tawney 
wrote: 
may be defined most simply as a trade which is organized . . . for the 
performance of a function.  It is not simply a collection of 
individuals who get a living . . . by the same kind of work.  Nor is it 
merely a group which is organized exclusively for the economic 
protection of its members . . . .  It is a body of men who carry on 
their work in accordance with rules designed to enforce certain 
standards . . . for the better service of the public. . . .  [I]t assumes 
certain responsibilities for the competence of its members [and] 
deliberately prohibits certain kinds of conduct on the ground that, 
though they may be profitable to the individual, they . . . bring into 
disrepute the organization to which he belongs.  While some of its 
rules are . . . designed primarily to prevent the economic standards 
of the profession [from] being lowered by unscrupulous competition, 
others have as their main object to [ensure] that no member of the 
profession shall have any but a purely professional interest in his 
work, by excluding the incentive of speculative profit.40 
This orientation shaped Cohen’s views about the ethical norms that 
should govern law practice.  For example, he opposed lawyer 
advertising,41 practicing law through “corporate intermediaries,”42 and 
 
 37. In passing, Cohen did express the hope that business ethics were moving 
toward a service orientation. See COHEN, supra note 30, at 40.  But Cohen’s concern 
was that “while one part of society has been professionalizing commerce, another has 
been commercializing the profession.” Id. at 43. 
 38. RICHARD HENRY TAWNEY, THE ACQUISITIVE SOCIETY (1920).  Tawney was 
an English economic historian, social critic, and Christian socialist.  His 
contemporary, French sociologist Emile Durkheim, had a similar understanding of 
the professions. See EMILE DURKHEIM, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND CIVIC MORALS 1–
41 (1958). 
 39. COHEN, supra note 30, at 331. 
 40. TAWNEY, supra note 38, at 93 (emphasis added). 
 41. COHEN, supra note 30, at 173–200, 348–49. 
 42. See id. at 264–76 (title and trust companies); id. at 299–301 (collection 
agencies); id. at 302–08 (trade associations).  As Bruce Green has shown, the salient 
motive behind barring lawyers from representing clients obtained through corporate 
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using “runners” to solicit clients.43  To insulate lawyers from the 
corrupting influence of business, Cohen also urged them to devote 
themselves solely to the practice of law.44 
 
intermediaries in the early 1900s was protectionism.  The chief criticism was that the 
arrangement gave lawyers who worked for or with corporate intermediaries an unfair 
competitive edge over lawyers who did not, because the intermediaries attracted 
clients for their lawyers through advertising and solicitation, which other lawyers—
the true professionals—considered an improper entanglement with the business 
practice of marketing. See Green, supra note 33, at 1126 n.52.  Cohen himself voiced 
this criticism. See COHEN, supra note 30, at 174–75.  Today, of course, the rules of 
legal ethics permit lawyers to advertise, so the original rationale for barring lawyers 
from practicing through corporate intermediaries is no longer serviceable.  But 
practicing through corporate intermediaries is still banned as the sharing of legal fees 
with nonlawyers, which is thought to compromise a lawyer’s exercise of independent 
judgment on behalf of clients. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4(a) 
(2012); ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 374 (1993).  The 
bar also continued in modern times to regard practicing law through a corporate 
intermediary as improperly assisting the intermediary in the unauthorized practice of 
law. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 297 (1961); 
ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Informal Op. 1181 (1971).  Though 
Cohen himself embraced this argument, see COHEN, supra note 30, at 246–60, it 
seems clearly to be a makeweight, because the legal services in question are 
performed by licensed attorneys. 
 43. See COHEN, supra note 30, at 200.  Cohen was also ambivalent at best about 
the growing tendency of lawyers to specialize.  Not only might the further division of 
legal labor undermine professional solidarity, but emerging specialties often brought 
lawyers into closer contact with business clients and, thus, commercial values. See id. 
at 31–32 (approving of Woodrow Wilson’s views on this point). 
 44. See id. at 15.  Cohen quoted with approval a New York judge who opined that 
an attorney should 
primarily reserve himself for his profession only[, where] he is held to the 
highest standard of ethical and moral uprightness and fair dealing.  There 
seems to be no good reason why a lawyer should be allowed to be honest as 
a lawyer and dishonest as a business man.  If he desires to go into business 
he must . . . see that his dealings as a business man are as upright as . . . his 
dealings [as a lawyer]. 
Id.  Today, the many lawyers who have dual occupations would see such remarks as 
an unjustified assault on their professionalism.  Yet a similar sentiment may still serve 
as a basis for barring law firms from having nonlawyer partners even if those partners 
are limited to helping the lawyers provide legal services.  If the ban were lifted, the 
nonlawyers who became law firm partners would often be economists, social workers, 
environmental engineers, nurses, tax accountants, and the like, many of whom would 
already have worked in law firms as employees. See James W. Jones & Bayless 
Manning, Getting at the Root of Core Values: A “Radical” Proposal to Extend the 
Model Rules to Changing Forms of Legal Practice, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1159, 1177 
(2000) (noting that since the late 1970s, the systematic hiring of nonlawyers in these 
fields to assist lawyers in delivering legal services has steadily increased).  Experts in 
such fields view themselves, and are viewed by others, as professionals.  Why 
presume that they would be more driven by the profit motive to behave unethically 
than today’s lawyers, or would press lawyers in their firm to do so?  It appears that 
many lawyers today either relegate these other professionals to the business side of 
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Cohen’s second fundamental point was that the line between 
business and profession must be policed in order to keep lawyers on 
the professional side, especially in large cities, where lawyers were 
growing in number and more heterogeneous.45  Under these 
conditions, informally socializing lawyers to embrace professional 
values would not suffice.  Regulation was also needed for the bar to 
maintain and vouch for the trustworthiness and competence of 
lawyers generally.  As Cohen famously put it, “we [lawyers] are all in 
a boat.  The sins of one of us are the sins of all of us.  Come, 
gentlemen, let us clean house.”46 
Cohen also had a clear idea about how the line should be policed.  
Two things were needed: a comprehensive set of practice norms to 
govern all lawyers (but only lawyers), and institutions to promote 
compliance.47  In Cohen’s view, both needs had to be filled by the 
increasingly organized bar (i.e., the profession in its corporate form), 
because ethical problems that members of a profession encounter in 
practice must be solved “by those who encountered them.”48 
 
Cohen’s dichotomy, or consider them less professional than lawyers, or consider the 
legal profession’s core values unique.  This is the thrust of the ABA House of 
Delegates pronouncement, when rejecting a proposal to allow a lawyer to practice in 
MDPs in 2000, that the “sharing of legal fees with nonlawyers and allowing 
nonlawyers to own and control firms engaged in the practice of law are inconsistent 
with the core values of the legal profession.” MDP Recommendation—Center for 
Professional Responsibility, supra note 9. 
 45. See Charles A. Boston, A Code of Legal Ethics, 20 GREEN BAG 224, 227 
(1908) (stating that in New York and other large cities after 1900, “there [was] no 
professional brotherhood; the Bar is too numerous and too heterogeneous”). 
 46. COHEN, supra note 30, at 109. 
 47. Id. at 158–65. 
 48. Id. at 158 (quoting philosopher Felix Adler, founder of the Ethical Culture 
Society, who believed that each profession must solve its ethical problems by 
regularly applying its own ethical norms to concrete issues that arise in practice).  To 
the same effect, see Herbert Harley, Group Organizations Among Lawyers, 101 
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 33, 34, 39 (1922).  Skeptics today might suppose 
that Cohen’s call for professional self-regulation was a strategy to stave off more 
onerous external regulation, but that would be a mistake; when Cohen wrote his 
book, external regulation was minimal at best.  The immediate need was to fill a 
regulatory vacuum.  Today, lawyers are subject to extensive external regulation, 
especially at the federal level. See John Leubsdorf, Legal Ethics Fall Apart, 57 BUFF. 
L. REV. 959 (2009) (identifying the broad range of federal laws and regulations that 
now govern lawyers specifically or as members of a broader class of service 
providers); Ted Schneyer, An Interpretation of Recent Developments in the 
Regulation of Law Practice, 30 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 559, 566–82 (2005) (same).  
The explosion of external regulations does not mean, however, that lawyers now 
accept a lesser role for self-regulation.  On the contrary, the need to sanctify the 
preservation of self-regulation as a core value of the profession seems to be felt more 
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Cohen was a pioneer in building the institutions of professional 
self-regulation.49  He extolled the ABA Canons of Ethics, issued in 
1908, as a milestone in the professionalization of lawyers, and was 
especially taken with the provision in Canon 12 that lawyers, when 
setting fees, should never forget that “the profession is a branch of 
the administration of justice and not a mere money-getting trade.”50  
He also served for years on the first bar association committee in the 
United States to issue advisory ethics opinions,51 supported Herbert 
Harley’s campaign for the creation of official, compulsory-
membership bars at the state level,52 and participated in early bar 
efforts to curb the unauthorized practice of law.53 
Cohen was also an idealist, but not naïve.  He acknowledged that 
some of the enthusiasm of his “brethren” for halting unauthorized 
practice stemmed from “an impulse to [ease] competition . . . for 
those who have paid . . . the heavy price of [getting an] education, of 
training and observ[ing] [the] ethical code of conduct governing the 
profession.”54  Others might call this an impulse of protectionism, but 
Cohen insisted that “the main impulse” behind the bar’s efforts to 
deter unauthorized practice was to “preserve and keep clean” a 
profession that exists primarily for the benefit of the community.55 
In my view, Cohen’s take on the relative force of these two 
“impulses” to deter unauthorized practice exposes the soft underbelly 
of the idiom of professionalism.  Cohen had to regard the community-
minded impulse as the key.  Giving the protectionist impulse more 
explanatory weight would have undermined his view of the 
business/profession distinction as a dichotomy based on motivation.  
 
acutely than ever, motivated perhaps by a desire to stave off still more external 
regulation. See, e.g., infra note 138 and accompanying text. 
 49. The term “self-regulation” is a misnomer in the sense that the state supreme 
courts are deeply involved.  Legislatures and executive branch agencies, however, are 
clearly outside the domain of self-regulation. 
 50. COHEN, supra note 30, at 204.  Consistent with his emphasis on a service ethic 
as an element of professionalism, Cohen also encouraged lawyers to regard legal fees 
as honoraria, and was critical of contingent fees on the ground that they eroded 
lawyerly disinterestedness. See id. at 201–16. 
 51. See id. at 159–70 (discussing the origin and work of the New York County 
Lawyers Association’s Committee on Professional Ethics). 
 52. See id. at 155–56, 322.  Harley headed the American Judicature Society. 
 53. See id. at 277–85. 
 54. Id. at 258; see also Pearce, supra note 28, at 17 (stating that the ideology of 
professionalism in Cohen’s day “conceded that flawed lawyers existed in significant 
numbers and that the invisible hand of reputation, while important . . . was 
insufficient to police the bar”). 
 55. Id. (emphasis added). 
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But, objectively speaking, who can say whether the community-
minded impulse really predominated over protectionism in Cohen’s 
day—or predominates now—in bar policymaking on the business 
aspects of law practice?  And if, as I believe, this is often impossible 
to determine objectively, perhaps the case for allowing nonlawyers to 
own an interest in law firms should turn on assessing the specific risks 
and benefits of doing so (with built-in regulatory protections), rather 
than divining (and then impugning) the motives of those who support 
or oppose nonlawyer ownership—an assessment that might well 
require some experimentation with nonlawyer ownership. 
 In any event, I think Cohen was wise, and largely accurate, to 
call the protectionist motive an “impulse,” which suggests that, when 
protectionism does influence lawyers’ views on regulating the 
business aspects of law practice, it does so unconsciously.  Whenever 
lawyers and bar groups oppose rules permitting lawyers to practice in 
ALPS, cynics may assume they are consciously seeking to protect 
themselves and their law firms from new sources of competition.  
Though I support liberalizing the rules against nonlawyer ownership 
to some degree, I prefer to assume that the opposition is in good 
faith.  But I wish the proponents of categorical bans on lawyers’ 
various business entanglements would refrain in ABA debates from 
trying to score rhetorical points by accusing their opponents of being 
motivated simply by “greed” or a desire for profits, as sometimes 
happens.56 
Some activities that Cohen abhorred, such as lawyer advertising57 
or practicing law through a corporate intermediary,58 might be 
defended on the ground that they promote competition in the legal 
services market and thereby reduce the cost of legal services and 
increase access to justice—supposedly a core value of the profession.59  
Cohen did not argue to the contrary.  He simply viewed such 
competition as unprofessional.  After praising the ABA’s adoption of 
 
 56. See, e.g., infra note 147 and accompanying text (noting criticism launched by 
ABA President Stanley Chauvin, Jr. against law firms that opposed a proposed ban 
on law firm ownership and operation of ancillary businesses).  In Cohen’s terms, of 
course, arguments accusing the proponents of rule changes that would permit some 
form(s) of nonlawyer ownership of law practice entities of being moved by profit 
considerations amounts to impugning their professionalism. 
 57. See COHEN, supra note 30, at 173–200, 348–49. 
 58. See id. at 264–76. 
 59. See MDP Recommendation—Center for Professional Responsibility, supra 
note 9. 
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its Canons of Ethics in 1908,60 and speculating about why it had taken 
“so long for the . . . Bar to emerge from darkness [and] develop its 
own guild or collective impulse,”61 he cited the “pressure of 
competition” as a key obstacle.62  But his point was not that lawyers 
should be entitled to monopoly rents.  Rather, he believed that 
professional solidarity, the “collective impulse,” was vital if the legal 
profession was to fulfill its social function, and he viewed the pressure 
of competition as antithetical to solidarity.63  Whether those who 
support rules today that are likely to have anti-competitive effects do 
so for Cohen’s reason is, of course, a different question. 
In sum, Cohen contributed at least four foundational ideas to what 
eventually became a full-blown idiom or ideology of professionalism.  
The first was his treatment of the business/profession distinction as a 
sharp dichotomy.  That idea, when internalized by lawyers, might be 
expected to make them categorically oppose law practice in business-
tinged ALPS rather than entertaining the possibility that ALPS, 
cabined by appropriate regulations, might yield net social benefits.64  
Cohen’s second idea was to ground the business/profession 
dichotomy on motives he considered to be in profound tension: 
profit-seeking in business versus public service in the legal profession.  
His third idea, a corollary of the second, was that market competition 
was a business phenomenon, inimical to professional solidarity, and, 
thus, a force that professional regulation should suppress, not 
promote.  And his fourth contribution was a commitment to 
professional self-regulation under the auspices of the organized bar 
(acting in tandem with the state supreme courts). 
 
 
 60. See COHEN, supra note 30, at 155 (describing the Canons as doing more “to 
stimulate the improvement of professional standards of conduct than any event in the 
history of the American Bar”). 
 61. Id. at 107.  Perhaps Cohen, taking a cue from Tawney, regarded competition 
between lawyers for clients as largely “unscrupulous.” See supra note 40 and 
accompanying text. 
 62. Id. at 110. 
 63. Indeed, Cohen was distrustful of competition generally.  He argued against 
the rigid application of antitrust laws to efforts of business competitors to cooperate 
through their trade associations. See generally Julius Henry Cohen, Ice, 13 B.U. L. 
REV. 1 (1933). 
 64. One might draw an analogy to the legal history of lawyer advertising, where a 
Supreme Court decision in 1977 forced the ABA and the state supreme courts to lift 
their bans on lawyer advertising in favor of a regulatory approach. See infra Part 
I.B.2.c. 
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B. The Bar’s Treatment of Lawyers’ Business Entanglements 
from Cohen’s Time to ABA Adoption of the Model Rules in 1983 
1. In-house Counsel 
As noted earlier, providing legal services through a corporate 
intermediary such as a trust company or collection agency was one of 
the ways lawyers become entangled with business that worried 
Cohen.65  To this day, that arrangement violates prevailing rules of 
legal ethics.66  But the fate of another entanglement that had a 
questionable ethical status as late as the 1920s—employment by a 
corporation to serve as in-house counsel to the company—has been 
quite different. 
When an in-house lawyer provides legal services to the company 
that employs her, there is no intermediary between lawyer and client.  
Yet in-house lawyers are entangled in business in other ways.  They 
are business employees, report to corporate officers who are agents of 
the client but not the client itself, and are often thought to be more 
beholden to those officers than are the company’s outside counsel, 
who may have a whole portfolio of clients.  In 1926, an ABA ethics 
opinion criticized in-house relationships on these grounds.67  The 
opinion concluded that a lawyer employed as a bank officer may not 
render legal services to the bank, chiefly on the ground that the 
lawyer would inevitably lack the professional independence to 
discharge the duties lawyers owe to courts and the public.68 
Today, of course, in-house counsel are universally accepted in the 
United States.69  But observers who would allow lawyers to practice 
 
 65. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
 66. This continues to be a disciplinable offense on the ground that it is a per se 
violation of the ban on sharing legal fees with nonlawyers, see MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4(a) (2012), or constitutes assisting the intermediary in the 
unlawful practice of law. See id. R. 5.5(a) & cmt. 1. 
 67. See ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Grievances, Formal Op. 10 (1926). 
 68. Id. (questioning how a lawyer, “being dependent on his employer’s pleasure 
for his livelihood,” could possibly exercise that independence of judgment and action 
that is “indispensible” to an advocate in court).  Notice that here, in contrast to the 
case of a lawyer working for a corporate intermediary, what needs protection is not 
independence to exercise professional judgment on behalf of a client, but sufficient 
independence from the client’s agents to discharge duties to others.  One wonders 
whether the latter form of independence is a lesser concern to the bar than the 
former and, if so, whether that accounts for the acceptance of in-house lawyering. 
 69. The early legitimization of in-house counsel may date to an ABA amendment 
to Canon 35 in 1928 and two ABA ethics opinions issued in 1931 that assumed that 
in-house lawyers were capable of withstanding pressures from company officials to 
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law in ALPS question why the imperative to protect lawyers’ 
independent professional judgment continues to serve as the ABA’s 
chief justification for a categorical ban on ALPS when, for decades, 
the same imperative has posed no obstacle to lawyers serving as in-
house counsel.70  Observers who see no principled basis for this 
distinction may chalk up the discrepancy to the power of corporate 
America to structure its relationships with counsel as it sees fit.  They 
may also suspect that the role of “independent professional 
judgment” in ABA policy debates on the permissible ownership and 
management structure of firms in which lawyer practice law is largely 
rhetorical.71  On this view, “independence” may be a core value of the 
profession, but it also serves as a rhetorical tool in bar policymaking, 
invoked when it is expedient and set aside when it is not. 
2. Bar Rules and Policies on Lawyers’ Business Entanglements that 
the Supreme Court Struck Down in the 1960s and 1970s 
In the 1960s and 1970s, the ABA and the organized bar generally 
had to defend ethics restrictions on three more “entanglements,” and 
in doing so further developed the idiom of professionalism. 
 
misbehave. See Green, supra note 33, at 1151 n.173.  Lawyers today express even 
more confidence on this point based on the growing status and sophistication of in-
house counsel. See, e.g., Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Foreword: The Future of the Legal 
Profession, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1083, 1090–91 (2000) (remarking on the changes in 
house-counsel’s status).  In Europe, however, the ability of in-house lawyers to 
remain sufficiently independent of their client’s owners and managers has continued 
to be questioned.  Lawyers who move in-house have had to give up their bar 
memberships and their communications with corporate officers on legal matters may 
not be protected by the attorney-client privilege. See Case C-550/07 P, Akzo Nobel 
Chems. Ltd. v. European Comm’n, 2010 E.C.R. I-08301 (holding that in-house 
counsel are not sufficiently “independent” of their corporate colleagues to make 
communications with them legally privileged). 
 70. See Jones & Manning, supra note 44, at 1196–97 (arguing that if the aim of 
Model Rule 5.4 is to maintain professional independence in any context where 
lawyers are supervised by, paid by, or report to nonlawyers, then the rule “must be 
dismissed as either grossly ineffective or cynically biased” because there are many 
arbitrary exceptions, including in-house counsel in corporations and government 
agencies, and staff attorneys whom liability insurers use to defend their insureds). 
 71. Cf. RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 9 (1989) (“Although the 
‘independence’ of lawyers remains an unquestioned shibboleth, it may express 
nostalgia more than it describes contemporary reality.”). 
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a. Defending the Ban on Lawyer Participation in Group Legal 
Services Plans 
By the 1930s, automobile clubs were offering legal services to their 
members, often on an insurance-like basis.72  Unions and other 
associations also developed plans to provide free or subsidized legal 
services as a benefit to their members, who typically had low-to-
moderate incomes.73  These group legal services (GLS) plans 
undoubtedly gave some people of modest means access to otherwise 
unavailable legal services.  Yet the organized bar attacked the plans, 
claiming that they inevitably interfered with lawyer-client 
relationships because some or all of the lawyers’ fees for service were 
paid not by the client, but by the organization of which the client was 
a member.74  The bar also claimed that plan providers were engaged 
in unauthorized practice of law (UPL), which in turn made it 
improper for lawyers to participate.  In other words, the bar treated 
even non-profit GLS plan providers as indistinguishable from 
corporate intermediaries.75 
 
 72. See Jones & Manning, supra note 44, at 1173. 
 73. See id. 
 74. See ABEL, supra note 71, at 136.  This was said to give plan providers undue 
leverage over the lawyers.  However, there was no general rule against lawyers 
accepting legal fees paid by third parties.  Parents, for example, could pay a lawyer to 
represent their children in, say, DUI cases.  The risk of third-party interference with a 
lawyer-client relationship was, and continues to be, tolerated in such cases. See, e.g., 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(f) (2012) (permitting lawyers to accept 
payment from third parties for representing a client provided the client gives 
informed consent; there is no “interference with the lawyer’s independence of 
professional judgment or with the client-lawyer relationship”; and confidential client 
information is protected). 
 75. See BARLOW F. CHRISTENSEN, LAWYERS FOR PEOPLE OF MODERATE MEANS 
256 (1970) (stating that before the 1960s, the profession’s position on obtaining 
lawyers’ services through intermediary arrangements was that “[a]ll intermediary 
arrangements except those—like legal aid—that have been exempted by definition—
and those—like casualty insurance arrangements—that the profession has chosen not 
to look at as intermediary arrangements, [were] completely prohibited”).  But, one 
might ask, “If the GLS plans were not-for-profit, why consider participating lawyers 
to be entangled with ‘business?’”  One answer might be that although corporate 
intermediaries were the paradigm, the bar saw no reason to make an exception for 
non-profit GLS plans, as it had for legal aid programs. See id. at 226 n.4.  A better 
answer may turn on the fact that although some non-profit GLS plans had open 
panels, which enabled any lawyer in the service area to participate, others had closed 
panels.  They contracted for services from a limited number of lawyers, which gave 
the plans some ability to ensure the quality of service.  Many lawyers were hostile to 
closed-panel plans because they gave lawyers on the panel a competitive edge over 
others in the service area.  This hearkened back to the unfair-competition objection 
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There were skirmishes between the bar and GLS plan providers for 
years, until a series of Supreme Court decisions in the 1960s struck 
down state bans on non-profit GLS plans as inconsistent with 
constitutional guarantees of free speech and association.76  For some 
time, the ABA resisted these decisions, especially as applied to 
closed-panel plans.  As promulgated in 1969, for example, the ABA 
Model Code of Professional Responsibility permitted lawyers to 
cooperate with non-profit closed-panel plans, but only when 
“controlling constitutional interpretation . . . require[d] the allowance 
of such legal service activities.”77 
Gradually, however, the bar relented.  In 1974, the Model Code 
was amended to give broad approval to open-panel plans, but closed-
panel plans remained improper unless they complied with a maze of 
highly restrictive conditions.78  A year later, Code rules were again 
liberalized in response to critical comments from the Antitrust 
Division of the Justice Department and to internal political pressure 
from rank-and-file ABA members who wanted the right to 
 
to lawyers obtaining a competitive edge by working through a corporate intermediary 
that advertised for law clients. See supra note 42. 
 76. See United Mine Workers of Am. v. Ill. State Bar Ass’n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967) 
(protecting plan by which union provided services of a salaried lawyer to assist 
members in worker’s compensation cases); Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. 
Va. State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964) (upholding a union program that referred injured 
members to lawyers selected by the union); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) 
(protecting a program in which staff attorneys assisted members and others in race 
discrimination cases).  In unsuccessfully defending these cases, the bar pointed to no 
evidence that GLS plans were causing harm to clients, yet argued that the lay 
intermediary problem was “at the heart of the hazards associated with group legal 
services,” and a significant threat to “the quality of service” because it would result in 
conflicts of interest and interference with the ability of lawyers to exercise 
independent professional judgment on behalf of clients. See Howard C. Sorenson, 
Bar Ethics: Guardian of the Profession, TRIAL, Mar.–Apr. 1975, at 15. 
 77. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-103(D)(5) (1969). 
 78. See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-103(D)(5) (1974).  
Closed-panel plans might be thought to pose a greater risk to lawyer independence 
because lawyers on a closed-panel might be more dependent on their earnings from 
the plan than lawyers on an open panel.  As late as the mid-1970s, however, some bar 
leaders made the anti-competitive argument that closed-panel plans posed a 
significant threat to “the existence of the vast majority of small law firms dependent 
upon middle income clientele.” Sorenson, supra note 76, at 15.  This raises the 
question whether lawyers who have reason to believe that they need only worry 
about professional self-regulation will not hesitate to support bar policies with naked 
appeals to professional self-interest. 
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participate in closed-panel plans.79  Finally, in 1987, four years after 
the ABA adopted the Model Rules, an ABA ethics opinion 
concluded that nothing in those rules categorically barred lawyers 
from participating as staff attorneys in a closed-panel, for-profit 
plan.80 
Today, one searches in vain for cases in which lawyers participating 
in GLS plans have been disciplined for permitting plan providers to 
interfere with their ability to exercise independent professional 
judgment on behalf of clients who were plan members.  After decades 
of trouble-free experience with GLS plans, it is clear that the bar’s 
concerns that they would compromise the exercise of independent 
judgment by plan lawyers and interfere with lawyer-client 
relationships were greatly exaggerated. 
This sequence, culminating in a messy ABA retreat, provides 
several insights into the relationship between the bar’s core values 
and the idiom of professionalism.  First, it shows that core values are 
sometimes in tension with one another, in which case they should not 
be portrayed, as they often are in idiom-based arguments, as absolute 
values brooking no compromise.  The Supreme Court’s intervention 
to protect GLS plans by constitutionalizing the issue was a blow to 
the primacy of professional self-regulation, a core value.  But it was a 
self-inflicted blow.  The bar triggered the intervention by insisting on 
protecting another core value—lawyer independence—by applying 
the ban on practicing law through an intermediary even to lawyer 
participation in open-panel, non-profit GLS plans.  This amounted to 
a conclusive presumption that plan sponsors would unduly interfere 
with the exercise of independent professional judgment by 
participating lawyers—with no evidence whatsoever to justify the 
presumption. 
Second, as noted above, pressure from lawyers who wanted to 
participate in closed-panel plans was also a factor that motivated the 
ABA to “compromise” the core value of lawyer independence in the 
context of GLS plans.81  If and when a sizable bar constituency presses 
the ABA to relax the ban on nonlawyer ownership—thereby 
 
 79. See Ted Schneyer, Multidisciplinary Practice, Professional Practice, and the 
Anti-Interference Principle in Legal Ethics, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1469, 1523 nn.213–14 
(2000) (citing authorities). 
 80. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 355 (1987).  
Instead, the opinion sets forth guidelines under which it would be permissible to 
participate in closed-panel plans. See id. 
 81. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
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providing the essential “groundswell of support” for liberalization—
we might see a similar contextualization of a once-categorical ban.  
But no bar constituency pressed the 20/20 Commission to relax the 
ban. 
b. The Bar’s Defense of Minimum Fee Schedules 
Minimum fee schedules are listings of minimum charges for various 
legal services which are recommended by the organized bar.  They 
date back to the eighteenth century, but their promulgation and use 
increased markedly during the Great Depression in the 1930s.82  From 
then until 1970, bar association ethics opinions83 and pronouncements 
of the state supreme courts84 offered high-minded justifications for the 
schedules.  But ethics opinions often included ominous warnings, for 
 
 82. See Wallace Rudolph, The Law as a Trade, 51 NEB. L. REV. 392, 398 (1972). 
 83. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 302 (1961) (“The 
establishment of . . . recommended fee schedules by bar associations is a thoroughly 
laudable activity.  The evils of fee cutting ought to be apparent to all members of the 
Bar. . . .  When members of the Bar are induced to render legal services for 
inadequate compensation . . . the quality of the service rendered may be lowered, the 
welfare of the profession injured, and the administration of justice made less efficient 
. . . .  [N]o lawyer should be put in the position of bidding competitively for clients.”). 
On a related point, an earlier ABA ethics opinion asserted that “lawyers’ competitive 
bidding for legal work would tend to reduce the profession to a mere money making 
business” and “lower the dignity of the profession.” ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, 
Formal Op. 292 (1957).  That opinion would have gratified Julius Henry Cohen, but 
would probably elicit derisive laughter from present-day lawyers whose firms vie in 
“beauty contests” for the business of corporate clients. 
 84. In 1960, the Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of its order 
creating the mandatory-membership Wisconsin State Bar, and bolstered its decision 
with an appendix listing significant State Bar activities and “the public purposes 
served thereby.” Lathrop v. Donohue, 102 N.W.2d 404, 411 (Wis. 1960).  One listed 
activity was the promulgation of a minimum fee schedule.  What public purpose was 
supposedly served?  “The present economic plight of the lawyers in this country,” the 
court wrote, 
is one which has disturbed the bench and the bar. . . .  [From] 1929 to 1951 
the net income of lawyers increased but 58 percent, while . . . that of dentists 
rose 83 percent and that of physicians 157 percent.  The quality of legal 
service which will be rendered to the public is likely to suffer if young men 
of ability are dissuaded from entering the profession because of the 
difficulty of securing an adequate financial reward to enable them to 
properly support themselves and their families. 
Id. at 413–14.  The capacity to view the protection of lawyers’ incomes as a public 
purpose rather than a matter of professional self-interest may be an ironic 
consequence of the bench and bar taking Cohen’s sharp distinction between the 
motive that drives business (profit) and the motive that drives the profession (public 
service) to mean that a bar association’s minimum fee schedule could not possibly be 
motivated by anything but the desire to serve, and serve well. 
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example, that “evidence that an attorney habitually charges less than 
the [fees] suggested [in a] minimum fee schedule . . . raises a 
presumption that such lawyer is guilty of misconduct.”85 
By 1972, the fee schedules were under attack.  An article in the 
ABA Journal86 suggested that minimum fee schedules were “not in 
the best interests of either the legal profession or society and that . . . 
[their] use . . . should cease.”87  The danger of antitrust liability 
became clear when an antitrust scholar published an article asserting 
that the schedules were a deliberate effort by lawyers, especially 
economically marginal lawyers in a time of reduced demand for legal 
services, to fix prices and limit competition.88  And in 1975, the 
Supreme Court intervened once again, declaring in Goldfarb v. 
Virginia State Bar that minimum fee schedules, backed by warnings 
that lawyers who “habitually” undercharge might be disciplined, 
restrained trade in violation of the Sherman Act.89  The high-minded 
rationales for the schedules did not succeed in justifying them. 
Once again the bar had discounted the significance of competition 
as a public value inscribed in law, even if not a core value of the 
profession.  Although Goldfarb made it clear that a minimum fee 
schedule adopted by a state supreme court rather than a bar 
association would be immune from antitrust liability,90 that has not 
happened.  And, as with the Supreme Court’s earlier rejection of the 
ban on lawyers participating in GLS plans, there is no evidence that 
the death of minimum fee schedules has adversely affected the 
provision of legal services or, for that matter, the image lawyers have 
of themselves as professionals. 
 
 85. Va. State Bar Comm. on Legal Ethics, Op. No. 170 (May 28, 1971); see also 
ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 302 (1961) (“[T]he habitual charging of 
fees less than those established in . . . recommended minimum fee schedules . . . may 
be evidence of unethical conduct.”). 
 86. Richard J. Arnould & Robert N. Corley, Fee Schedules Should Be Abolished, 
A.B.A. J., July 1971, at 655. 
 87. Id. at 655.  The article also noted that providing “a satisfactory standard of 
living for lawyers [and] establish[ing] [price] uniformity in order to prevent 
‘shopping’ or price competition” were rationales the bar commonly invoked to justify 
the schedules. Id. at 656. 
 88. See Rudolph, supra note 82, at 398. 
 89. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).  Years earlier, in an unguarded moment, the Virginia 
State Bar had openly supported the need for minimum fee schedules in terms of 
professional self-interest, declaring that “lawyers have slowly, but surely, been 
committing economic suicide as a profession.” Id. at 786 n.16, (quoting VA. STATE 
BAR, MINIMUM FEE SCHEDULE REPORT 3 (1962)). 
 90. See id. at 777–79. 
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c. The Bar’s Defense of the Ban on Lawyer Advertising 
After the GLS cases and Goldfarb, the bar was on notice that 
ethics rules which stifle competition or limit access to legal services 
can and will be scrutinized for compliance with external law.  Only 
two years after Goldfarb, the Supreme Court reinforced the point, 
striking down on First Amendment grounds the categorical ban on 
lawyer advertising in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona.91  In applying its 
First Amendment balancing test, the Court had to evaluate the 
Arizona State Bar’s justifications for the ban.  According to the 
Court, the bar placed: 
particular emphasis on the adverse effects that it feels price 
advertising will have on the legal profession.  The key to 
professionalism, it is argued, is the sense of pride that involvement 
in the discipline generates.  It is claimed that price advertising will 
bring about commercialization, which will undermine the attorney’s 
sense of dignity and self-worth.  The hustle of the marketplace will 
adversely affect the profession’s service orientation, and irreparably 
damage the delicate balance between the lawyer’s need to earn and 
his obligation selflessly to serve.  Advertising is also said to erode 
the client’s trust in his attorney: Once the client perceives that the 
lawyer is motivated by profit, his confidence that the lawyer is acting 
out of a commitment to the client’s welfare is jeopardized.  And 
advertising is said to tarnish the dignified public image of the 
profession.92 
This defense of the advertising ban exemplifies the bar’s 
unsuccessful reliance on the idiom of professionalism to defend 
against legal challenges to ethics rules that ban lawyers from 
entangling themselves with business.  The Supreme Court, operating 
outside the domain of professional self-regulation, wasn’t buying it.  
The Court called the “postulated connection” between advertising 
and the erosion of professionalism “severely strained,”93 found the 
assertion that advertising would diminish lawyers’ reputations “open 
to question,”94 and declared that the bar’s “belief that lawyers are 
somehow ‘above’ trade has become an anachronism.”95 
 
 91. 433 U.S. 350 (1977). 
 92. Id. at 368.  Call me cynical, but I can’t quite believe that before lawyer 
advertising was permitted it never dawned on clients that lawyers might be 
motivated, at least in part, by the prospect of earning profits. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 369.  The Court noted that a profession that eschews advertising “while 
condoning the actions of the attorney who structures his social or civic associations so 
as to provide contacts with potential clients” may actually promote public “cynicism.” 
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Bates ended the advertising ban and ushered in an era of regulated 
lawyer advertising.96 That era has not been free of disputes about the 
proper scope of regulation.97  But experience with lawyer advertising 
since Bates shows that the bar’s idiom-based arguments that striking 
down the ban would have disastrous consequences were overblown. 
C. The ABA’s Pre-20/20 Debates on Whether the Model Rules 
Should Permit Nonlawyer Ownership of Law Practice Entities 
and Lawyer or Law Firm Ownership of “Ancillary Businesses” 
The final elaboration and hardening of the idiom of 
professionalism as it was deployed in the 20/20 Commission’s ALPS 
debate occurred in three earlier ABA debates in the Model Rules 
era.  Two concerned the ALPS issues the Commission later 
considered; the third concerned whether to adopt a proposed Model 
Rule barring lawyers from owning or operating entities that provide 
“non-legal services which are ancillary to the practice of law.” 
1. The Kutak Commission’s ALPS Proposal 
The ABA adopted the Model Rules in 1983.  When the drafting 
body, the ABA Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards 
(Kutak Commission),98 submitted its proposed rules to the House, a 
radical provision permitting but regulating nonlawyer ownership of 
law practice entities was included.  The Kutak Commission’s 1981 
 
Id. at 370–71.  Moreover, in referring to the bar’s “postulated connection” between 
advertising and “an erosion of professionalism,” and calling the bar’s assertion that 
advertising would diminish lawyers’ reputations “open to question,” the Court 
seemed to recognize an aspect of the idiom of professionalism not yet discussed in 
this Article, namely, reliance on vague “concerns” rather than empirically grounded 
(or at least potentially testable) propositions about the risks and benefits of the rules 
in question. Cf. infra Part I.C.3.  Bates suggests that even if the idiom is rhetorically 
effective in internal bar policy debates, it will not necessarily win the day when the 
bar must defend its idiom-supported policies before external decision-makers.  For a 
recent decision to the same effect, see Alexander v. Cahill, 634 F. Supp. 2d 239 
(N.D.N.Y. 2007) (striking down portions of a New York rule regulating lawyer 
advertising, and criticizing the regulator for failing to identify the substantial 
government interest at stake, to show how the rule “directly and materially” 
furthered that interest, or prove that it was narrowly drawn). 
 95. Bates, 433 U.S. at 371–72. 
 96. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 7.1, 7.2(a), 7.3(b)–(c), 7.4 (2012). 
 97. See, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995) (rejecting a 
constitutional challenge to Florida rules prohibiting lawyers from using direct mail to 
solicit personal injury clients within thirty days of their accident). 
 98. The drafting body is commonly called the Kutak Commission.  Robert Kutak, 
the Commission chair from 1977 to 1983, died in 1983. 
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Draft of Proposed Model Rule 5.4 would have permitted a lawyer to 
be “employed by an organization in which a financial interest is held 
or managerial authority is exercised by a non-lawyer . . . but only if 
the terms of the relationship provide in writing that”: 
(a) There is no interference with the lawyer’s independence of 
professional judgment or with the client-lawyer relationship; 
(b) Information relating to representation of a client is protected as 
required by Rule 1.6; 
(c) The arrangement does not involve advertising or personal 
contact with prospective clients prohibited by Rule 7.2 or 7.3; and 
(d) The arrangement does not result in charging a fee that violates 
Rule 1.5.99 
To support this proposal, the Commission argued that (1) “[t]he 
assumed equivalence between [nonlawyer ownership]  and 
interference with the lawyer’s professional judgment is at best 
tenuous”; (2) “exceptions to per se prohibitions on legal service 
arrangements involving nonlawyers have substantially eroded the 
general rule, leading to inconsistent treatment of various methods of 
organization”; and (3) “[a]dherence to the traditional prohibitions has 
impeded development of new methods of providing legal services.”100 
In the House debate, however, the Kutak proposal ran into a wall 
of objections expressed in the idiom of professionalism.101  One 
objection was that the rule would permit Sears, H & R Block, and 
large accounting firms to open law offices in competition with 
traditional law firms.102  Another was that the nonlawyer partners in 
 
 99. GILLERS, supra note 8, at 345 (quoting Report of the Commission on 
Evaluation of Professional Standards, in ANNUAL REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR 
ASSOCIATION 886–87 (1982)). 
 100. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4 cmt. (Proposed Final Draft 1981).  
With its proposed Rule 5.4, the Kutak Commission served notice that by the 1980s 
not all bar leaders and constituencies continued to be committed to a categorical ban 
on nonlawyer ownership of entities in which lawyers practice law.  The key point was 
not to abandon lawyer independence as a core value, but instead to protect that value 
with a rule prohibiting lawyers from acquiescing to interference rather than a rule 
conclusively presuming that interference would occur. 
 101. See Thomas R. Andrews, Nonlawyers in the Business of Law: Does the One 
Who Has the Gold Really Make the Rules, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 577, 595 (1989).  
Professor Andrews quotes some telling remarks expressing these objections from an 
unedited transcript of the House of Delegates’ session on February 3, 1983. See id. at 
595 nn.107–10.  That transcript was unofficial; the ABA did not release an official 
transcript. 
 102. See id. at 595 n.107 (statement of Al Conant) (“You each have a constituency.  
How will you explain to the sole practitioner who finds himself in competition with 
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MDPs would inevitably interfere with the professional independence 
of the firm’s lawyers.103  A third was that nonlawyer ownership would 
destroy the lawyer’s ability to be a professional regardless of the 
economic cost.104  A fourth was that the proposal was “unwise policy 
because if nothing else, it was demeaning to the profession.”105  And a 
fifth was that the change would have fundamental but unknowable 
effects on the legal profession.106  These objections prevailed; a 
substitute amendment was adopted reaffirming the categorical bans 
on nonlawyer ownership and lawyers sharing legal fees with 
nonlawyers that had been added to the Canons in 1928 and were 
maintained in the Code of Professional Responsibility.107 
 
Sears why you voted for this?  How will you explain to the man in the mid-size firm 
who is being put out of business by the big [accounting] firms?”).  One consequence 
of having the rules of legal ethics decided in the first instance by the ABA rather than 
an external rulemaker may be that a toting up of lawyers’ preferences tends to 
receive greater weight than more objective policy arguments. See supra note 25 and 
accompanying text (noting that the co-chairs of the 20/20 Commission cited the lack 
of a “groundswell of support” from the profession as a reason why the Commission 
decided not to recommend the Draft Resolution on ALPS to the House of 
Delegates). 
 103. See id. at 595 n.108 (statement of Bob Hawkins) (“I cannot conceive that a 
lawyer can maintain his independence and independent judgment . . . when he’s on a 
salary from [a firm] that’s looking over his shoulder at his results in terms of profit.  
Now if you wish to destroy our profession as we’ve known it [or] the young lawyer’s 
opportunities in this country to enjoy the same professional independence that you 
and I have known, then . . . support the Commission.”). 
 104. See id. at 595 n.109 (statement of Charles Kettlewell) (arguing that it is not 
“cost-effect[ive]” to “provide full representation,” to “zealously represent your 
client,” or “spend enough time with your client to get the job done properly,” but “as 
professionals, . . . we must do those things;” and if there is a violation of the ethics 
rules, “it is not the business venture who [sic] owns [the firm that will be disciplined, 
because] the business is [not under the] jurisdiction” of the state courts and bar).  The 
fact that the rules of legal ethics only apply to, and are enforced against, lawyers is 
often cited as a reason to bar nonlawyers from owning entities in which lawyers 
practice law. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 3-1 (1983).  But 
modern law firms already employ large numbers of nonlawyers, and the Model Rules 
make it clear that, for disciplinary purposes, law firm partners and other lawyers who 
supervise those nonlawyers must take reasonable measures to ensure that the 
nonlawyers conduct themselves in a manner consistent with the ethical duties of 
lawyers. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.3 (2012). 
 105. Andrews, supra note 101, at 595 n.109 (statement of Frank Rosiny) (emphasis 
added). 
 106. See id. at 595 n.110 (statement of Al Conant) (“No one can tell you what the 
impact of [the Kutak Commission’s proposed Rule] 5.4 is going to be, but [if 
adopted] it is going to . . . mark a fundamental change in the practice of law.”).  This 
criticism seems to assume that the presently unknowable effects would all be bad, or 
that bad effects would predominate, or that any bad effects would be so grave and 
irreversible that the risks of bringing them about would never be worth running. 
 107. See GILLERS, supra note 8, at 344. 
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2. Rejection of Proposals to Permit Lawyers to Practice in MDPs 
In 1998, the ABA president appointed a Commission on 
Multidisciplinary Practice (MDP Commission).  In June 1999, after 
holding public hearings and receiving comments on the background 
materials it circulated, the MDP Commission filed a 
Recommendation and Report with the House of Delegates proposing 
that Model Rule 5.4 be amended to permit lawyers to share legal fees 
with nonlawyers in an MDP.108 
In August 1999, the House tabled that recommendation and 
resolved not to amend the Model Rules to permit lawyers to practice 
law in MDPs “unless and until additional study demonstrates that 
such changes will further the public interest without sacrificing or 
compromising lawyer independence and the legal profession’s 
tradition of loyalty to clients.”109  This resolution was linked to the 
idiom of professionalism in at least two respects. 
 
 108. See Memorandum from the ABA Ad Hoc Comm. on Multidisciplinary 
Practice to the Officers and Council of the ABA Section of Bus. Law (Aug. 4, 1999), 
available at http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/ 
commission_multidisciplinary_practice/adhocmemo.html.  The MDP Commission 
defined an MDP as: 
a partnership, professional corporation, or other association or entity that 
(a) includes lawyers and nonlawyers and has as one, but not all, of its 
purposes the delivery of legal services to clients other than the MDP itself, 
or (b) holds itself out to the public as providing nonlegal, as well as legal, 
services. 
Id. 
The Commission’s 1999 Recommendation did not propose specific amendments to 
the Model Rules but provided a framework that the ABA ethics committee or some 
other body could use to draft such amendments.  For present purposes, the key 
points of the MDP Commission’s 1999 recommendation were that it would permit 
lawyers to practice in MDPs with nonlawyer partners, that the nonlawyers could 
provide nonlegal services to their own clients, and that the lawyers’ fees could be 
shared with the nonlawyers.  While the version of Model Rule 5.4 that the Kutak 
Commission included in its 1981 proposed final draft would apparently have gone so 
far as to permit passive ownership by outsiders, see supra note 99 and accompanying 
text, the MDP Commission’s proposals did not. See ABA COMM’N ON 
MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES (2000), 
available at http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/ 
commission_multidisciplinary_practice/mdpfinalrep2000.html (“5. Passive investment 
in a Multidisciplinary Practice should not be permitted.”). 
 109. MDP Recommendation—Center for Professional Responsibility, supra note 9 
(emphasis added).  According to one MDP Commission member, “[c]oncern about 
the supposed need to protect the majesty of the legal profession characterized much 
of the first wave of reactions to the [Commission’s 1999] Report.” Burnele V. Powell, 
Flight from the Center: Is It Just or Just About Money?, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1439, 1455 
(2000).  For Powell, the “highpoint” of this reaction was a speech to the House by 
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First, the “unless and until” clause amounts to a presumption 
against allowing nonlawyer ownership of entities in which lawyers 
practice law.  Such presumptions have become an element of the 
idiom.110  But in hindsight, the earlier debates on the rules that should 
govern lawyers’ entanglements with business suggest that such 
presumptions are often unwarranted.  Consider, for example, the 
bar’s history with group legal services plans.111  The paucity of 
evidence of nonlawyer interference with lawyer’s professional 
judgment or of nonlawyer-induced disloyalty to clients in the decades 
since the Supreme Court struck down that ban suggests that the ABA 
was unjustified in presuming at the outset that allowing lawyers to 
participate in such plans would result in conflicts of interest and 
interference with lawyers’ ability to exercise independent professional 
judgment on behalf of clients.112  In similar terms, Bruce Green has 
 
attorney Larry Fox in support of a motion to table the Commission’s 
Recommendation and Report.  In Powell’s colorful description, Mr. Fox: 
recounted in almost mystical terms how he had recently dreamed about a 
world that was so horrifying in its portent that he had been left shaken and 
afraid for the future of the legal profession.  Jeremiah-like, he had seen a 
future wrought with such danger for the legal profession that the only 
salvation lay in utter rejection of even the willingness to consider the subject 
of multidisciplinary practice. 
    What was the great evil that portended a plague on the profession?  It 
was the very idea that the practice of law might be thought of as a 
“professional service” that could be rendered through an ownership 
structure involving principals who were not lawyers.  As his dream dissolved 
into nightmare, Mr. Fox reported that he was horrified to discover that by . . 
. 2050, or so, law firms no longer existed.  In their place, there had arisen—
Scary! Scary!—MDPs. . . .  It was a world in which those who were once 
known as lawyers now kowtowed to accountants. 
Id. at 1455–56.  The proposition that proposals to permit nonlawyer ownership of 
firms in which lawyers practice law are too dangerous for the House to even consider 
reappears in comments the 20/20 Commission received from opponents of the Draft 
Resolution on ALPS. See, e.g., Letter from Richard L. Thies to ABA Comm’n on 
Ethics 20/20, at 4 (Feb. 23, 2012) [hereinafter Thies Letter], available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/ethics_20_2
0_comments/thies_alpsdiscussiondraft.authcheckdam.pdf (“The proposals that have 
been offered for consideration have been given great public distribution resulting in 
the public perception that the profession is interested in allowing non-lawyers to 
invest in law firms.  The Commission should clearly state now that the profession is 
not for sale to the highest bidder.”). 
 110. See infra Part II.B.1. 
 111. See supra Part I.B.2.a. 
 112. See supra note 76.  Nor have the bar’s dire prophecies that the profession, 
lawyer-client relations, and the quality of legal services would all suffer substantially 
as a result of permitting lawyer advertising and bringing an end to minimum-fee 
schedules, come to pass. 
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criticized the bar’s presumption against all forms of nonlawyer 
ownership of entities in which lawyers practice law: given the 
“equivocal history” of the disciplinary rules at the heart of the MDP 
debate, Green wrote, “it might be argued that opponents of change 
should have the burden of proving that the existing [bans on 
nonlawyer ownership] are essential . . . .  At the very least, the 
question ought to be debated . . . without any presumptions one way 
or the other.”113 
In response to the August 1999 House resolution, the MDP 
Commission sought expert advice about the feasibility of conducting 
the sort of study the “unless-and-until” clause demanded.  The advice 
was discouraging.  The Institute for Social Research at the University 
of Michigan advised the Commission that terms like “the public 
interest,” “independence,” and “loyalty” could not be defined in a 
manner that was independent of perceptions.114  And economists who 
were consulted about the value of conducting market research to 
gauge the demand for MDP services advised that “there is only one 
way to find out if there is a demand, and that is to see if there turns 
out to be a market.”115  As a practical matter, then, although the 
Commission received expressions of support for MDPs from client 
 
 113. Green, supra note 33, at 1157–58 (emphasis added).  Green also predicted at 
the time that the bar would “employ the rhetoric of lawyer independence and core 
professional values . . . to hide its efforts to promote lawyers’ economic dominance . . 
. .  There will be no serious effort to gather empirical evidence of whether clients will 
be ill-served or misled by new collaborations between lawyers and nonlawyers.”  
Although the bar’s rhetoric may have force, this probably will not be because of the 
strength of the underlying reasoning.  Reason enough exists on both sides of the 
debate.  “Indeed,” Green added: 
proponents of multidisciplinary practice could embrace professionalism as 
justification for reducing regulation.  After all, if one has faith in lawyers as 
professionals . . . there is no compelling need for restrictions designed to 
protect lawyers from the pressures or inducements of nonlawyers who might 
lead them astray.  The effort to reform the present disciplinary rules might 
be characterized . . . as an attack on the unwarranted assumptions that 
lawyers are too weak to withstand the influence of nonlawyer collaborators. 
Id. at 1156 (emphasis added). 
 114. ABA COMM’N ON MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE, supra note 108.  This 
second report recommended more modest changes to permit lawyers to practice in 
MDPs, but the House rejected that proposal by a vote of 314 to 106.  The House also 
disbanded the MDP Commission and adopted the sweeping resolution discussed in 
note 13 supra. 
 115. ABA COMM’N ON MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE, supra note 108 (emphasis 
added). 
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groups and some bar constituencies,116 the House’s “unless and until” 
presumption proved to be irrebuttable, a “Catch-22.” 
Second, the House insisted that the Commission demonstrate that 
MDPs would both serve the public interest and not “sacrifice or 
compromise” lawyer independence and loyalty to clients.117  This 
seemed to imply either that the public interest can never be served by 
permitting a new law practice structure that poses any risk of 
compromising those core values or, alternatively, that no new 
structure that could provide public benefits (perhaps by reducing 
costs, promoting innovations in legal services, or improving access to 
justice), would be acceptable if it also put core values at any risk.  The 
MDP Commission, in deciding to recommend changes that would 
permit but regulate MDPs, had obviously not taken either of those 
paths. 
But what path did the MDP Commission take to reach its 
conclusion that MDPs should be permitted but regulated?  John 
Matheson and Edward Adams have suggested that the Commission 
could perhaps have reached that conclusion using a methodology 
more consistent with general norms of public policymaking.118  The 
Commission, they observe, could have determined whether MDPs 
would place a burden on core values and, if so, determined whether 
MDPs would provide economic benefits to lawyers and clients and, if 
so, balanced the prospective economic benefits against the 
prospective harm to core values to see whether, with appropriate 
regulation, MDPs could be allowed.119  On this analysis, without ruling 
out every conceivable risk to core values, the Commission might have 
decided that at least some MDPs could be permitted.120  The reaction 
 
 116. Client groups expressing support included the American Corporate Counsel 
Association (ACCA) (now the Association of Corporate Counsel) and several 
consumer organizations. Id. app. pt. A & nn.8–19.  For further evidence of interest in 
MDPs among consumer groups and bar constituencies, see Lowell J. Noteboom, 
Professions in Convergence: Taking the Next Step, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1359, 1392–97 
(2000). 
 117. See supra note 109 and accompanying text. 
 118. See John H. Matheson & Edward S. Adams, Not “If” but “How”: Reflecting 
on the ABA Commission’s Recommendations on Multidisciplinary Practice, 84 
MINN. L. REV. 1269, 1289–90 (2000). 
 119. See id. 
 120. See id.  Of course, any conclusion reached by this route would probably be 
controversial because of disagreement about the weights to assign to the values and 
interests at stake.  Interestingly, Matheson and Adams conclude from the MDP 
Commission’s 1999 Report that the Commission did not use that methodology either.  
Instead, they argue, the Commission made the political judgment that clients, 
consumer groups and some lawyer constituencies “dictated a change” in MDP rules, 
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of the House of Delegates to the MDP Commission’s 2000 
Recommendation and Report, which presented a more limited 
proposal to permit MDPs,121 was equally hostile and, if anything, more 
portentous for any future ABA consideration of nonlawyer 
ownership of law practice entities.  The House rejected that proposal 
by a vote of 314 to 106, disbanded the Commission, and resolved that 
“[j]urisdictions should retain and enforce laws that generally bar the 
practice of law by entities other than law firms”; that “[t]he sharing of 
legal fees with nonlawyers and the ownership and control of the 
practice of law by nonlawyers are inconsistent with the core values of 
the legal profession”; and that “[t]he law governing lawyers, that 
prohibits lawyers from sharing legal fees with nonlawyers and from 
directly or indirectly transferring to nonlawyers ownership or control 
over entities practicing law should not be revised.”122 
 
and then proceeded to consider what rules would “best counter” whatever “new 
ethical problems” MDPs would create. Id. at 1290 (emphasis added).  Of course, that 
approach would arguably be inconsistent with the Commission’s charge to 
“determine what changes, if any, should be made to the Model Rules.” Id. at 1290–93 
& n.104 (emphasis added). 
 121. The MDP Commission’s 2000 proposal called on the ABA to amend the 
Model Rules consistent with five principles: 
1. Lawyers should be permitted to share fees and join with nonlawyer 
professionals in a practice that delivers both legal and nonlegal professional 
services (Multidisciplinary Practice), provided that the lawyers have the 
control and authority necessary to assure lawyer independence in the 
rendering of legal services.  “Nonlawyer professionals” means members of 
recognized professions or other disciplines that are governed by ethical 
standards. 
2. The Recommendation must be implemented in a manner that protects 
the public and preserves the core values of the legal profession, including 
competence, independence of professional judgment, protection of 
confidential client information, loyalty to the client through the avoidance 
of conflicts of interest, and pro bono publico obligations. 
3. Regulatory authorities should enforce existing rules and adopt such 
additional enforcement procedures as are needed to implement these 
principles and to protect the public interest. 
4. The prohibition on nonlawyers delivering legal services and the 
obligations of all lawyers to observe the rules of professional conduct should 
not be altered. 
5. Passive investment in a Multidisciplinary Practice should not be 
permitted. 
ABA COMM’N ON MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE, supra note 108. 
 122. MDP Recommendation—Center for Professional Responsibility, supra note 9. 
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3. The Ancillary Business Debate123 
In 1986, The ABA formed a commission to study the “question of 
professionalism.”124  In its report to the House, the Commission on 
Professionalism stated that it was “disturbed by . . . increasing 
participation by lawyers in business activities.”125  The Commission 
cited as an example a growing pattern of law firms operating 
businesses that provide services “ancillary to the practice of law.”126  
The Commission questioned whether practicing lawyers should 
become “active in the operation of any business,” asserted that “the 
greater the participation by lawyers in activities other than the 
practice of law, the less likely it is that the lawyer can capably 
discharge the obligations which our profession demands,”127 and 
urged the ABA “to see what, if any, controls or prohibitions should 
be imposed.”128 
Two ABA units studied the ancillary business issue and developed 
rival policy proposals.  In 1989, the ABA Special Coordinating 
 
 123. This section draws heavily on Schneyer, supra note 28. 
 124. ABA COMM’N ON PROFESSIONALISM, IN THE SPIRIT OF PUBLIC SERVICE: A 
BLUEPRINT FOR THE REKINDLING OF LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM (1986), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/professional_resp
onsibility/stanley_commission_report.authcheckdam.pdf.  The Commission was 
largely funded by the ABA Litigation Section, id. at v, and was chaired by former 
ABA president Justin Stanley, id. at 82.  It is often referred to as the Stanley 
Commission. 
 125. Id. at 30. 
 126. Id. at 31.  In the 1980s, law firms, most notably in Washington, D.C., began to 
experiment with arrangements for providing their clients with the law-related 
services of professionals such as accountants, economists, lobbyists and 
environmental engineers. See Schneyer, supra note 28, at 364 n.9, 367 nn.21, 23 
(citing sources).  Some firms hired these nonlawyers directly, while others placed 
them in subsidiary consulting firms that provided services to the affiliated law firm’s 
clients and other customers.  Law firms often considered the subsidiary form 
attractive because ethics rules barred lawyers from having nonlawyer-partners in 
their firms, but top-notch experts often preferred to participate in these ventures as 
principals. See James W. Jones, The Challenge of Change: The Practice of Law in the 
Year 2000, 41 VAND. L. REV. 683, 690 (1988).  Government relations (i.e., lobbying) 
ancillaries were especially common in Washington. Stephanie B. Goldberg, More 
Than the Law: Ancillary Business Growth Continues, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1992, at 55. 
 127. Recall that this was Julius Henry Cohen’s view as well. See supra note 44 and 
accompanying text.  This argument boils down to the idea that by taking time away 
from her law practice to operate an ancillary business, a lawyer puts two commonly 
cited core values of the legal profession at risk—competence and access to justice.  In 
1991, the ABA Litigation Section made this argument in its briefly successful 
campaign to prohibit law firms from owning and operating ancillary business.  For my 
criticism of the argument, see Schneyer, supra note 28, at 373–74. 
 128. ABA COMM’N ON PROFESSIONALISM, supra note 124, at 31. 
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Committee on Professionalism (SCCOP), which was created to 
implement the Professionalism Commission’s recommendations, 
appointed a Working Group on Ancillary Business Activities 
(WGABA).129  The WGABA did not consider it within the ABA’s 
province to “declare, for all 700,000 American lawyers, what 
constitutes the only proper content of each of our particular ways of 
making a living.”130  Anticipating that the ancillary business issue 
might call for ethics rulemaking, the WGABA chose to address what 
it considered the pertinent “regulatory issues,” but put aside 
“professionalism issues,” which it did not find “amenable to the 
ordinary apparatus of inquiry and study.”131  In other words, the 
WGABA treated the making of ethics rules to govern law practice as 
an inappropriate domain for arguments grounded on vague 
conceptions of professionalism.  WGABA member Dennis Block 
dissented, arguing that the professionalism issues were “by far the 
most important” and could serve as a proper basis for ethics rules.132 
This methodological issue was joined when the Litigation Section 
set up its own Task Force on Ancillary Business Activities (TFABA), 
with Block as chair.133  Driven by its professionalism concerns, the 
TFABA drew up a proposal for a Model Rule 5.7 that would ban all 
involvement by practicing lawyers in the delivery of ancillary services 
except those that a law firm provides in-house and in connection with 
a matter on which it was also providing a client with legal services.134  
If approved by the ABA and adopted by the state courts, such a rule 
would be a death-knell for ancillary-business subsidiaries, and would 
limit in-house programs as well.135 
 
 129. Mark I. Harrison et al., Debate Continues on Lawyers’ Role in “Ancillary” 
Business, 2 PROF. LAW 1, 1 (1990).  The WGABA was chaired by Phoenix attorney 
Mark Harrison, a former chair of the ABA Committee on Professional Discipline. 
 130. Id. at 4. 
 131. See Dennis J. Block et al., Model Rule of Professional Conduct 5.7: Its Origin 
and Interpretation, 5 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 739, 781 (quoting a memorandum to the 
WGABA from its Reporter, Professor Daniel Reynolds).  The decision to put 
“professionalism issues” aside suggests that by 1990, some ABA leaders saw the 
idiom of professionalism as a threat more than an aid to sound policymaking on the 
business aspects of law practice. 
 132. Id. 
 133. See id. at 793.  For a list of TFABA members, most of whom were litigators at 
large firms without ancillary businesses, see id. at 793 n.243. 
 134. See id. at 797. 
 135. Interestingly, an early version of the proposal exempted sole practitioners 
from the ban on the ground that although many solos in rural areas had traditionally 
provided ancillary services that raise the same ethical issues as the newer large-firm 
programs, solo operations somehow do not “implicate serious professionalism 
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Meanwhile, SCCOP and the WGABA concluded that ancillary 
businesses do pose certain ethical risks—the risk that clients (or 
customers) would be confused about whether they were entitled to 
the protections accorded in lawyer-client relationships, the risk of 
conflicts arising between a law client and an ancillary customer (or 
between two customers), and the risk that law firms might misuse one 
client or customer’s confidences to benefit another.136  Convinced, 
however, that ancillary services benefit clients and that 
professionalism concerns did not justify a broad ban on ancillary 
businesses, SCCOP urged the ABA ethics committee to draft a 
proposal for a Model Rule 5.7 that would regulate rather than ban 
such businesses.137  The ethics committee did so, and the rival versions 
of Rule 5.7 went to the House of Delegates for consideration in 
August 1991. 
Shortly before the House took up the rival proposals, delegates 
from the Litigation Section sent their House colleagues a letter 
summing up the difference between the two proposals.  The letter 
hearkened back to Cohen’s dichotomy.  “In our opinion,” the authors 
wrote: 
the resolution of [this] controversy goes to the heart of who we are 
as a profession and what we will become. . . .  [Y]ou must decide 
whether we wish to continue as a self-regulating profession 
committed to both its traditional (and unique) ethical obligations 
and to public service, even at the cost of turning away some profits 
from non-legal ventures, as the Litigation Section . . . recommends.  
In the alternative, you may decide that the lawyer’s traditional 
ethical obligations should be supplanted by the ethics of the 
marketplace and that law firms should be allowed to become profit-
 
concerns.” Id. at 796.  The final version that went to the House dropped this 
exemption, but only on the understanding that if the ban affected the long-standing 
provision of ancillary services by lawyers in certain states, those states could 
“grandfather” those services. Id. at 798.  Justin Stanley, the chair of the Commission 
on Professionalism insisted there was a sound distinction here.  “What is happening 
today,” he claimed, “is quite different from what has happened in the past.  Then 
isolated acts of individual lawyers were involved. . . .  Today . . . law firms as entities 
are involved in business activities.  These activities . . . are based on prior economic 
policy decisions by the firms and often involve large sums of money.” Justin A. 
Stanley, Lawyers in Business, 8 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 17, 18 (1987) (emphasis added). 
 136. See Schneyer, supra note 28, at 371. 
 137. Id. at 371 & n.56 (citing ABA SPECIAL COORDINATING COMM. ON 
PROFESSIONALISM, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES ON ANCILLARY 
BUSINESS ACTIVITIES OF LAWYERS AND LAW FIRMS 11–12 (1990)). 
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oriented conglomerates like other businesses, as the [Ethics] 
Committee proposes.138 
Presented with this stark choice, the House voted 197 to 186 to 
strike a blow for professionalism.  It adopted the Litigation Section’s 
Rule 5.7.139  But opponents of the rule regrouped, and in August 1992 
convinced the House to repeal the rule.140  In 1994, the House 
adopted a very different version of Rule 5.7, one that was consistent 
with the ethics committee’s regulatory approach.141  Since then, the 
 
 138. Block et al., supra note 131, at 799 (quoting Letter from Judah Best et al. to 
ABA House of Delegates 3–4 (July 19, 1991)) (emphasis added). 
 139. As adopted in 1991 (but repealed in 1992) Model Rule 5.7 provided in 
pertinent part: 
(a) A lawyer shall not practice law in a law firm which owns a controlling 
interest in, or operates, an entity which provides non-legal services which 
are ancillary to the practice of law, or otherwise provide such ancillary non-
legal services, except as provided in paragraph (b). 
(b) A lawyer may practice law in a law firm which provides non-legal 
services which are ancillary to the practice of law if: 
  (1) The ancillary services are provided solely to clients of the law firm and 
are incidental to, in connection with and concurrent to, the provision of 
legal services by the law firm to such clients; 
  (2) Such ancillary services are provided solely by employees of the law firm 
itself and not by a subsidiary or other affiliate of the law firm; 
  (3) The law firm makes appropriate disclosure in writing to its clients; and 
  (4) The law firm does not hold itself out as engaging in any non-legal 
activities except in conjunction with the provision of legal services, as 
provided in this rule. 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.7 (repealed Aug. 1992). 
 140. See Don J. DeBenedictus, House of Delegates: Close Vote Rescinds 
Provisions Against Ancillary Business, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1992, at 110.  This time the 
vote was 190 to 183.  No U.S. jurisdiction has ever adopted the 1991 version, but the 
Litigation Section was satisfied that the short-lived 1991 version had symbolic value.  
Soon after that version was adopted, a Litigation Section spokesman “conceded 
privately that the rule was ‘not likely to be adopted anywhere,’ but asserted that the 
Section had nonetheless ‘made its point.’” Schneyer, supra note 28, at 388 (citing 
Letter from Mark Harrison, Chairman, ABA Special Coordinating Comm. on 
Professionalism, to Lee Cooper, Chairman, ABA House of Delegates 2 (Aug. 27, 
1991)).  On the other hand, the ABA Standing Committee on Professional Discipline 
quickly called for reconsideration on the ground that the rule was unenforceably 
vague. See id. at 388 n.162. 
 141. See GILLERS, supra note 8, at 387–92 (summarizing the legislative history of 
Rule 5.7, including further amendments in 2002).  The 1994 version was proposed by 
the Special House of Delegates Committee on Ancillary Business in Support of the 
1994 Version of Rule 5.7. See Schneyer, supra note 28, at 391.  In its report to the 
House, the Special Committee concluded that the provision of law-related services 
should not be prohibited, but should be regulated.  The Special Committee also 
found that “law-related services are being provided wherever lawyers practice, that 
[those services] are often provided by separate entities, and that there has been no 
reported disciplinary infraction or malpractice claim resulting from the provision of 
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delivery of law-related services in ancillary business has continued to 
grow with no significant evidence of ethical problems.142  Although 
the Litigation Section ultimately lost this battle, the question is how it 
won the day in the first place.  I believe the Section leaders could not 
have prevailed, even temporarily, without mesmerizing themselves 
and the House by invoking “professionalism concerns.”143  Here are 
three examples. 
 
law-related services.” Id. at 393–94 (quoting from the Special Committee’s report).  
The current version of Rule 5.7 simply makes a lawyer “subject to the Rules of 
Professional Conduct with respect to the provision of law-related services” if the 
services are provided by the lawyer “in circumstances that are not distinct from the 
lawyer’s provision of legal services to clients” or are provided 
in other circumstances by an entity controlled by the lawyer individually or 
with others if the lawyer fails to take reasonable measures to assure that a 
person obtaining the law-related services  knows that the services are not 
legal services and that the protections of the client-lawyer relationship do 
not exist. 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.7(a) (2012).  “The term ‘law-related 
services’ denotes services that might reasonably be performed in conjunction with 
and in substance are related to the provision of legal services, and that are not 
prohibited as unauthorized practice of law when provided by a nonlawyer.” Id. R. 
5.7(b). 
 142. See Lowell J. Noteboom, Professions in Convergence: Taking the Next Step, 
84 MINN. L. REV. 1359, 1365, 1398 n.15 (2000) (reporting that as of 1999, more than 
ten percent of the 200 largest law firms in the United States were already operating 
ancillary businesses and the number was increasing).  For many examples, see id. at 
1365–73.  A somewhat related phenomenon has also grown apace—lawyers who 
work with other professionals in consulting or professional-service firms, where they 
render services such as lobbying or tax advice without holding themelves out as 
engaging in the practice of law and, as a practical matter, need not comply with many 
rules of legal ethics. See Hazard, supra note 69, at 1092 (estimating that as many as 
one third of U.S. lawyers now work in such settings). See generally Tanina Rostain, 
The Emergence of “Law Consultants,” 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1397 (2006).  Whether 
changes in the rules of legal ethics to permit lawyers to practice in MDPs and law 
firms with nonlawyer owners would encourage some of these “émigrés” to return the 
profession’s regulatory fold is unclear, but that was one of the MDP Commission’s 
objectives. See ABA COMM’N ON MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE, supra note 108, at 
app. pt. B.4 & nn.31–33. 
 143. See Schneyer, supra note 28, at 366.  One eloquent lament about the time and 
energy that went into the ancillary business debate came from Ralph Elliott, a 
member of the ABA ethics committee. 
The [Litigation] Section talks about a loss of something vaguely called 
“professionalism” and a fear that lawyers could face regulation by 
nonlawyers if they were to engage in [ancillary business] activities.  Its 
report evokes remembrance of a pristine professional past that never was 
and fears of a subjugated future that never will be.  Indeed, many purport to 
see in the Section’s report simply a “save-our-turf” concern, with a subtext 
of anti-competitive restraints upon trade. 
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i. The Precautionary Principle 
Larry Fox, a Litigation Section leader, argued that ancillary 
businesses should be banned because they could ultimately destroy 
the legal profession’s privilege of self-regulation.  His argument put 
the dangers of ancillary businesses on the same footing as those of 
global warming: 
[W]hile the writer would concede [that] the likelihood that the 
ancillary business movement will lead to the loss of self-regulation is 
no more determinable [than] the likelihood that Merrill Lynch will 
end up owning Shearman & Sterling,144 the only relevant question is 
whether the profession is willing to take that indeterminable risk, 
when what we are talking about is the likelihood that what will be 
lost are aspects of the profession that are so fundamental no amount 
of financial benefit could justify the loss.  Quite simply, it is too 
much to ask the profession to wait to see if the worst fears are 
realized.  By the time they occur, the damage will be irreparable.145 
Mr. Fox made no effort to identify a plausible mechanism by which 
law firm ownership and operation of ancillary businesses could 
destroy professional self-regulation.  Although many law firms have 
been operating ancillary business for years, there is no evidence 
 
See id. at 366–67 n.20 (quoting ABA COMM. ON ETHICS & PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, 
RECOMMENDATION AND REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES (1991) (Minority 
Report of Ralph G. Elliot)). 
 144. Mr. Fox’s reference to nonlawyer ownership of law firms in an argument 
against law-firm ownership and operation of ancillary businesses suggests that he saw 
the two as equally undesirable lawyer entanglements with business. 
 145. Schneyer, supra note 28, at 372–73 (quoting Lawrence J. Fox, Address at the 
ABA 17th National Conference on Professional Responsibility: Is Half a Loaf Better 
than None? 7–8 (May 21–24, 1991)).  The precautionary principle, which is implicit in 
this argument, can operate as anything from a mere adage (“better safe than sorry”) 
to a rule shifting the burden of proof in environmental policy debates. See 
Christopher D. Stone, Is There a Precautionary Principle?, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10790–
10, 10799 (2001) (discussing various ways of understanding the principle). 
Dennis Block suggested one mechanism by which self-regulation would be eroded 
unless the ABA banned ancillaries.  Block argued that the Federal Trade 
Commission would get its nose under the regulatory tent by interceding to ban law 
firms’ ancillary businesses on the ground that they would lead to abusive self-
referrals and constitute an unfair trade practice. See Block et al., supra note 131, at 
799–800.  The astonishing thing about this theory is that months before the House 
adopted its ban, the FTC welcomed law firms’ ancillary business for their “potential 
to provide significant benefits to consumers,” and stated that it had “no wish to 
impede their development.” See FTC Unit Lauds Law-Firm Diversification, LEGAL 
TIMES (D.C.), Apr. 8, 1991 (quoting Letter from Kevin Arquit, Dir., FTC Bureau of 
Competition, to George Kuhlman, Counsel, to the ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l 
Responsibility (Mar. 27, 1991)). 
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whatsoever that this has generated significant ethical problems or 
undermined professional self-regulation.  Fox’s jeremiad has proven 
to be anything but prophetic. 
ii. A Preoccupation with Motive 
Since Cohen’s day, one of the bar’s most cherished conceits is that 
lawyers, as professionals, must be motivated by a desire to serve, not 
to reap profits.  This conceit played a role in the ancillary business 
debate.  When the Washington, D.C. law firm of Arnold & Porter 
opened several ancillary businesses in the 1980s, it did so, according 
to Jim Jones, its managing partner at the time, to accommodate 
clients whose transactions demanded a “team effort” in which 
“lawyers work closely with other professionals . . . to achieve the 
clients’ goals in the most direct and cost effective way.”146  But ABA 
President Stanley Chauvin Jr. saw only greed behind such ventures.  
“I truly doubt,” he wrote, 
that the lawyers who create ancillary business are motivated by a 
desire to serve clients or the public more effectively and at lower 
cost.  The risk of putting the lawyer-client relationship in jeopardy 
appears more likely to be motivated by profit.  The client’s best 
interest is sacrificed in favor of the law firm’s quest to make 
money. . . .  [W]hen we consider our clients’ rights—when we 
consider any risks to them against any prospective gains to the law 
firm—there is only one conscientious conclusion: The risks far 
outweigh the gains.147 
One reason Chauvin’s risks outweigh his gains may be a belief that 
lawyers’ profits, seen through the lens of “professionalism,” cannot 
even be viewed as evidence that clients benefit from the ancillary 
services they buy.  On this point, however, that lens distorts reality.  
Of course Arnold & Porter would not have opened its ancillaries 
without hoping to profit.  But so what?  What lawyers do in practice 
to earn money is usually meant to serve client interests; the law firm 
that opens a new branch office or adds a new practice group will hope 
to benefit clients and thereby profit.  The real policy question 
regarding whether to permit ancillary businesses, or MDPs, or law 
firms with nonlawyer owners is one of foreseeable societal costs and 
benefits, not lawyers’ motives. 
 
 146. Jones, supra note 126, at 690. 
 147. L. Stanley Chauvin, Jr., A Conscientious Conclusion, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1990, at 
8. 
SCHNEYER_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE) 4/15/2013  5:46 PM 
2012] “PROFESSIONALISM” AS PATHOLOGY 117 
iii. No Sense of Duty to Support Their Opposition to Lawyer or 
Law Firm Ownership of Ancillary Businesses with Available 
Evidence 
When attempting to influence ABA policymaking for the practice 
of law, bar entities and lawyers should support their positions with 
evidence, if reasonably available, that bears on the issues at hand.148  
For purposes of gauging the risks and utility of ancillary businesses in 
the ABA’s 1991 debate, evidence could have been gathered because a 
substantial number of ancillaries were already in operation.149  Yet 
only the ABA entities that supported a continuation of the ancillary 
business experiment—SCCOP and the ABA ethics committee—
submitted useful evidence.  SCCOP obtained a report from twenty-
five law firms summarizing their experience with ancillaries,150 and the 
ethics committee obtained comments from the Federal Trade 
Commission, which reflected a consumer perspective.151  But the 
Litigation Section, which proposed the ban on law firms owning and 
operating ancillary businesses, did nothing to further the fact-finding 
effort.152  If professionalism is the issue, why bother? 
 
 148. See supra note 29.  This aspirational duty is arguably implicit in the 
proposition that “[a]s a public citizen, a lawyer should seek improvement of the law, 
access to the legal system, the administration of justice and the quality of service 
rendered by the legal profession.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, Preamble 
and Scope ¶ [6] (2000). 
 149. See supra notes 126, 142. 
 150. See Schneyer, supra note 28, at 368 n.29, 387 n.153. 
 151. The FTC’s comments were positive and stressed the pro-competitive effects of 
permitting law firms to have ancillary businesses.  The Director of the FTC Bureau of 
Competition stated that “law firm diversification has the potential to provide 
significant benefits to consumers,” but “[t]he Litigation Section’s approach would 
reduce these benefits substantially.” FTC Unit Lauds Law-Firm Diversification, 
LEGAL TIMES (D.C.), Apr. 8, 1991, at 14 (quoting Letter from Kevin Arquit, Dir., 
FTC Bureau of Competition, to George Kuhlman, Counsel, ABA Comm. on Ethics 
& Prof’l Responsibility (Mar. 27, 1991)). 
 152. On the contrary, the Litigation Section muddied the debate by citing spurious 
“evidence” to support a ban on the ground that allowing law firms to own and 
operate ancillary businesses would lead to scandals and lawsuits that would damage 
the reputation of the legal profession.  In a report to the ABA House of Delegates, 
the Section cited a memo from a malpractice insurer’s loss prevention counsel to its 
insureds warning that too many of the firms were engaging in “entrepreneurial 
activities” that were likely to generate lawsuits. See Schneyer, supra note 28, at 378 
n.101 (citing ABA LITIG. SECTION, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 21 n.17 
(1990)).  The authors of the memo quickly made it clear, however, that they had not 
been concerned about ancillary businesses but, rather, about lawyers investing in 
their clients’ businesses. Id. at 378 & n.102 (citing Letter from Robert O’Malley to 
Mark Harrison, Chairman, Special Coordinating Comm. on Professionalism Working 
Grp. 2 (Oct. 18 1990) (on file with author) (stating that the Litigation Section 
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By tracing the evolution of the idiom of professionalism from 
Julius Henry Cohen’s day to the year 2000, and the use of the idiom 
over that period in bar policymaking on issues involving lawyers’ 
business entanglements as well as in the bar’s unsuccessful legal 
defense of rules banning those entanglements, Part I has set the stage 
for my critique of the idiom-based arguments the opponents of 
nonlawyer ownership made to the 20/20 Commission. 
II.  A CRITIQUE OF THE IDIOM-BASED ARGUMENTS THE 
OPPONENTS OF NONLAWYER OWNERSHIP MADE TO THE 20/20 
COMMISSION 
I turn now to the written submissions the 20/20 Commission 
received on the subject of nonlawyer ownership of law practice 
entities during the ALPS debate.  Most were submitted in response to 
the Commission’s calls for comment on the ALPS Working Group’s 
Draft Resolution and Report153 and its earlier Issues Paper on 
Alternative Business Practice.154  Part II analyzes a representative 
sample of these submissions with three aims in mind: to show that 
opponents of nonlawyer ownership repeatedly relied on a handful of 
arguments, to link those arguments to rhetorical tools and concepts 
associated with the idiom of professionalism, and to criticize the 
arguments themselves. 
Altogether, the 20/20 Commission received more than thirty 
written submissions that address the Working Group’s proposal and 
nonlawyer ownership of law-practice entities, generally.  Most of the 
submissions were from lawyers or bar entities155 and the great 
 
“appears to have misinterpreted [Attorneys’ Liability Assurance Society’s] ALAS’ 
position and has used ALAS’ memorandum to support a position that the 
memorandum does not in fact support”)).  ALAS also reported that none of the 
2,000 claims filed against their insured firms as of the late 1980s involved the 
“activities challenged by the Litigation Section.” Id. at 378 & n.103 (quoting Letter 
from William Freivogel to Mark Harrison, Chairman, Special Coordinating Comm. 
on Professionalism Working Grp. 2 (Oct. 3, 1990)).  Moreover, in the same report to 
the House, the Litigation Section suggested that two recent law firm “scandals” 
would have been avoided if proposed Rule 5.7 had been in effect.  But the rule 
almost certainly would not have been relevant in either case. See id. at 379 & nn.105–
09 (explaining why the rule would have been irrelevant and citing sources). 
 153. See ALPS Draft Resolution, supra note 17. 
 154. See ALPS Issues Paper, supra note 10. 
 155. See ALPS Comments Chart, supra note 18. 
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majority of these were strongly negative.156  Because many of the 
negative responses were duplicative or insubstantial,157 I focus on a 
representative subset158 consisting of those I found most substantive.159  
 
 156. For the few comments the Commission received in favor of amending Model 
Rule 5.4 to permit nonlawyer ownership, see sources cited supra notes 20–21.  The 
comments discussed here are cited in note 158 and analyzed in Part II.B. 
 157. The comments I put aside tend to be very short, often no longer than a 
paragraph. 
 158. Letter from John H. Beisner, Partner, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom 
LLP, to ABA Comm’n on Ethics 20/20 (June 1, 2011) [hereinafter Comments of U.S. 
Chamber Inst. for Legal Reform], available at http://www.americanbar.org/ 
content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/ethics_20_20_comments/uschamberinstit
uteforlegalreform_issuespaperconcerningalternativebusinessstructures.authcheckda
m.pdf (regarding comments of the U.S Chamber Institute for Legal Reform on the 
issues paper concerning alternative business structures); Joseph E. Neuhaus, 
Comments of the New York State Bar Association Committee on Standards of 
Attorney Conduct on Ethics 20/20’s Issue Paper Concerning Alternative Business 
Structures (June 9, 2011) [hereinafter Comments of NYSBA], available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/ethics_20_ 
20_comments/newyorkstatebarassociationcommitteeonstandardsofattorneyconduct_i
ssuespaperconcerningalternativebusinessstructures.authcheckdam.pdf; Letter from 
Mark Chandler et al. to ABA Comm’n on Ethics 20/20 (Feb. 29, 2012) [hereinafter 
Comments of Nine General Counsel], available at http://www.americanbar.org/ 
content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/ethics_20_20_comments/ninegeneralcou
nselcomments_alpschoiceoflawinitialdraftproposal.authcheckdam.pdf; Letter from 
Susan A. Feeney, President, N.J. State Bar Ass’n, to ABA Comm’n on Ethics 20/20 
(Jan. 31, 2012) [hereinafter Comments of NJSBA], available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/ethics_20_ 
20_comments/njstatebarassociation_alpsdiscussiondraft.authcheckdam.pdf; 
Lawrence J. Fox, MDP Redux—Slay the Dragon Again . . . Now! (Jan. 30, 2012), 
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/ 
ethics_20_20_comments/fox_alpsdiscussiondraft.authcheckdam.pdf; Letter from 
Douglas R. Richmond to ABA Comm’n on Ethics 20/20 (Jan. 6, 2012) [hereinafter 
Richmond Letter], available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/ 
administrative/ethics_2020/ethics_20_20_comments/richmond_alpsdiscussiondraft.aut
hcheckdam.pdf; Letter from Richard L. Thies to ABA Comm’n on Ethics 20/20 (Feb. 
23, 2012) [hereinafter Thies Letter], available at http://www.americanbar.org/ 
content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/ethics_20_20_comments/thies_alpsdiscus
siondraft.authcheckdam.pdf.  These responses are listed on the ALPS Comments 
Chart, supra note 18. See also Joan C. Rogers, Speakers Debate Nonlawyers’ Role in 
Firms at First Ethics 20/20 Commission Hearing, 26 Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct 
(ABA/BNA) 110 (Feb. 17, 2010) (reporting on testimony given at the Commission’s 
public hearing on Feb. 5, 2010). 
 159. Readers can judge the representativeness of the written comments and 
testimony I discuss by consulting all of the comments the 20/20 Commission received 
by April 2, 2012 at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ 
ethics_2020/ethics_20_20_comments/la_county_bar_association_finalreviseddraftpro
posals_tech_and_confidentiality_client_dev_and_outsourcing.authcheckdam.pdf. 
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These responses were often preoccupied with MDPs and law firms 
with outside investors rather than the Draft Resolution itself.160 
Drawing on the history of the idiom of professionalism in Part I, 
Part II.A identifies six concepts or rhetorical tools that are associated 
with the idiom of professionalism and salient in the opponents’ 
arguments against the Working Group’s proposal and nonlawyer 
ownership generally.  Part II.B then examines a number of those 
arguments, links each argument to one of the elements of the idiom, 
and criticizes the argument itself.  Because the six elements overlap to 
some degree, some of the arguments could be linked with more than 
one element. 
A. Six Elements of the Idiom of Professionalism That Are 
Salient in the Opponents’ Arguments Against Nonlawyer 
Ownership 
Two of the six elements of the idiom to be discussed are 
“procedural”; they tended to skew the ALPS debate in the 
opponents’ favor.  The other four elements were used to establish a 
plausible downside for the Working Group’s proposal. 
The first procedural element posits that the proponents of the 
Working Group’s proposal had the burden of proof in the debate and 
would have to overcome a strong presumption in favor of the status 
quo (the existing ban).  The opponents justified these ground rules by 
characterizing the very limited form of nonlawyer ownership the 
Draft Resolution would allow as a profound departure from 
longstanding professional rules and traditions.161 
The second procedural element is a biasing and selective approach 
to the role of empirical evidence in the debate.  This element 
privileges the opponents to present their arguments without 
supporting evidence while criticizing the Working Group for 
providing nothing more than “anecdotal evidence” to support theirs.  
For example, just as opponents of the MDP Commission’s 1999 
recommendation to allow lawyers to practice in MDPs succeeded in 
tabling the recommendation “unless and until” studies demonstrate 
that MDPs (none of which existed in the United States at the time) 
would further the public interest without compromising core values,162 
 
 160. See generally ALPS Draft Resolution, supra note 17. 
 161. See infra notes 176–84 and accompanying text. 
 162. See AM. BAR ASS’N, THE FLORIDA BAR REPORT WITH RECOMMENDATION TO 
THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 2 (2000), available at http://www.floridabar.org/ 
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so opponents of nonlawyer ownership in the ALPS debate found the 
Working Group’s proposal unacceptable because the accompanying 
Draft Report failed to provide rigorous evidence that allowing 
lawyers to practice in law firms with a very limited form of nonlawyer 
ownership would benefit lawyers and clients.163  At the same time, the 
opponents felt no need to provide any plausible evidence to support 
their claims that allowing even a highly restricted form of nonlawyer 
ownership would “compromise core values.”164  Although the core 
values are embedded in enforceable rules of legal ethics,165 the 
opponents failed to produce any evidence of “compromise” that 
countered the Working Group’s finding that two decades of 
experience with a less restrictive form of nonlawyer ownership in 
Washington, D.C. had produced no pertinent disciplinary 
complaints.166  This mirrored the failure of the Litigation Section to 
provide any plausible evidence that permitting lawyers and law firms 
to own and operate ancillary businesses would embroil them in 
business scandals and bring an end to professional self-regulation.167 
Opponents of the Working Group’s ALPS proposal relied on four 
more elements of the idiom to justify their claim that even the highly 
restrictive form of nonlawyer ownership the Draft Resolution would 
permit had a substantial downside.  The first, consistent with Cohen’s 
dichotomy,168 posits that nonlawyer ownership in any form is an 
inherently corrupting business entanglement and must therefore be 
banned categorically.169  On this view, the alternative of permitting 
 
TFB/TFBResources.nsf/BC390EF1565832AE85256A4F006AEEA8/2F91DA541FD
B7A2885256B29004BECBC/$FILE/mdpaba.pdf (“RESOLVED, that the American 
Bar Association make no change, addition or amendment to the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct which permits a lawyer to offer legal services through a 
multidisciplinary practice unless and until extensive and well-reasoned analysis 
demonstrates that such changes will further the public interest without sacrificing or 
compromising lawyer independence and the legal profession's tradition of loyalty to 
clients.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 163. See Richmond Letter, supra note 158, at 2. 
 164. See infra Part II.B.2. 
 165. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2012) (duty of competence); 
id. R 1.6 (duty of confidentiality); id. R. 1.7 (duty of loyalty); id. R. 5.4(c) (duty to 
maintain independent professional judgment in rendering legal services). 
 166. See Joan C. Rogers, Trio of Federal Suits Challenge Ethics Rule That Stops 
Private Equity Investment in Firms, 27 Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 
382, 383 (June 8, 2011) (reporting information the Commission received from the 
D.C. Bar Counsel’s Office). 
 167. See supra notes 145, 152 and accompanying text. 
 168. See supra notes 37–44 and accompanying text. 
 169. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
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but regulating some form(s) of nonlawyer ownership is no more 
acceptable than permitting but regulating lawyer advertising or 
participation in GLS plans had been—before the Supreme Court said 
otherwise.170 
A closely related element is the slippery slope theory, which in this 
context means that even if adopting the Working Group’s proposal 
would not itself be objectionable, it would inexorably lead to the 
legalization of more radical forms of nonlawyer ownership, which 
would be objectionable.171 
Another element of the idiom that the opponents used in an effort 
to establish a plausible downside for the Working Group’s proposal 
was the familiar voicing of unsubstantiated concerns that nonlawyer 
ownership, if permitted, would compromise the core values of the 
profession and therefore be unacceptable—however modest the 
compromise or risk thereof might be.172 
Finally, a sixth element of the idiom was used not to establish a 
plausible downside for the Working Group’s proposal, but rather to 
negate a possible benefit.  The ALPS Draft Report suggested that, in 
the absence of demonstrated harm, allowing lawyers to practice in 
firms that have nonlawyer owners might be desirable as a way to 
promote competition in the legal services market.173  One opponent 
relied on the proposition that even if doing so would promote 
competition, that point deserved no weight because, from the 
standpoint of professionalism, promoting lawyer competition is an 
irrelevant, if not a negative, value,174 as Cohen believed.175 
 
 
 170. See supra notes 74–75, 91–96 and accompanying text. 
 171. See infra Part II.B.4. 
 172. Indeed, some opponents went so far as to insist that nonlawyer ownership can 
only be defended if it can be shown to advance the core values. See infra note 184 
and accompanying text accompanying. 
 173. See ALPS Draft Resolution, supra note 17, at 3. 
 174. See Richmond Letter, supra note 158, at 3; see also infra text accompanying 
note 218.  In defending its ban on lawyer advertising in Bates, the Arizona State Bar 
unsuccessfully made the analogous argument that the “hustle of [an ad-infused] 
marketplace” would undermine the legal profession’s service orientation. Bates v. 
State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 368 (1977).  The “hustle of the marketplace” is, of 
course, a pejorative term for competition. 
 175. See supra notes 62–63 and accompanying text. 
SCHNEYER_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE) 4/15/2013  5:46 PM 
2012] “PROFESSIONALISM” AS PATHOLOGY 123 
B. A Critique of the Opponents’ Idiom-Based Arguments 
Against the Working Group’s Proposal 
1. Proponents of Nonlawyer Ownership Must Bear the “Burden of 
Proof” 
In their comment on the ALPS Discussion Paper, general counsel 
at nine U.S.-based companies asserted that in the debate on 
nonlawyer ownership, the burden of proof should fall on those who 
proposed such a “fundamental change” to Rule 5.4, and that the 
proponents had failed to meet that burden.176  This raises a question 
of characterization.  Assuming that the general counsels’ argument 
here is not based on the slippery slope theory, what makes amending 
Model Rule 5.4 to permit such a limited form of nonlawyer ownership 
a “fundamental” change?  Is it more fundamental than, say, the much 
earlier decision to permit lawyers to be employed by corporations to 
serve as in-house counsel?177 
Putting aside the question-begging characterization of the Working 
Group’s proposed changes as “fundamental,” and bracketing out 
slippery slope arguments for the moment, why should the proponents 
of such a limited form of nonlawyer ownership have the burden of 
proof?178  In his comment on the Draft Resolution, Richard Thies, a 
bar leader in Illinois, purported to find the answer in ABA 
precedent,179 namely, the extremely broad House of Delegates 
resolution that ended the MDP debate in 2000.180  As noted earlier, 
that resolution declared, without elaboration, that “[t]he sharing of 
legal fees with non-lawyers and the ownership and control of the 
practice of law by nonlawyers are inconsistent with the core values of 
 
 176. Comments of Nine General Counsel, supra note 158, at 8. 
 177. See supra notes 69 and accompanying text.  Explicit ABA approval of 
working in-house as an employee of a corporate client came in 1928, with the 
addition of a new canon of ethics. See ABA CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS, Canon 35 
(1969) (“A lawyer may accept employment from any organization . . . to render legal 
services in any matter in which the organization, as an entity, is interested . . . .”). 
 178. Recall Bruce Green’s point that one might just as well argue that “the 
opponents of change should have the burden of proving that the [existing bans] are 
essential . . . .  At the very least, the question ought to be debated . . . without any 
presumption one way or the other.” Green, supra note 33, at 1157–58.  Perhaps the 
“imposition” of the burden on proponents of measures that would narrow the ban on 
nonlawyer ownership is an inevitable consequence of relying on our system of 
professional self-regulation.  If so, that inevitability does not, in my view, commend 
the system. 
 179. See Comments of Nine General Counsel, supra note 158, at 63. 
 180. See id. at 64. 
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the legal profession.”181  Mr. Thies argued that this pronouncement 
should be dispositive because “[n]othing that has happened since 
2000 would warrant a reversal” and “[t]he facts have not changed.”182  
But he did not say what “facts” supported the 1999 resolution in the 
first place, or why the recent reforms that broadly authorize 
nonlawyer ownership in the U.K. and Australia183 is not a changed 
fact.  Nor did he consider whether the 1999 resolution might have 
been adopted with nothing quite as narrow as the Working Group’s 
resolution in mind. 
Finally, in what may have been an effort to raise to unscalable 
heights the burden of proof that proponents of allowing nonlawyer 
ownership must meet in order to justify any liberalization of the ban, 
the president of the New York State Bar Association, when 
appointing a task force to reconsider nonlawyer ownership in light of 
the 20/20 Commission’s work, told the task force to consider 
“whether a change would further advance the core values,” and 
explained that nonlawyer ownership should not be considered “unless 
it is going to advance” those values.184  Does this mean, for example, 
that nonlawyer ownership in any form is worth considering only if it 
would make lawyers more competent, independent, loyal to clients, 
and/or protective of client confidences?  If not, what does it mean? 
2. A Biasing and Selective Approach to the Use of Empirical 
Evidence 
Opponents of nonlawyer ownership took a biasing and selective 
approach to the role of empirical evidence.  They felt no need to 
support their arguments against the Working Group’s proposal with 
any evidence but, at the same time, dismissed the Draft Report’s 
arguments in favor of the proposal on the ground that they were 
supported by no more than “anecdotal” evidence. 
 
 181. MDP Recommendation—Center for Professional Responsibility, supra note 9. 
 182. Comments of Nine General Counsel, supra note 158, at 63. 
 183. See ALPS Issues Paper, supra note 10, at 7–10, 13–15 (identifying the relevant 
reforms). 
 184. John Caher, Ethics Panel Addresses Issue of Non-Lawyer Owned Firms, N.Y. 
L.J., Mar. 22, 2012, at 1, available at http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/ 
PubArticleNY.jsp?id=1202546510694&slreturn=1 (quoting Vincent Doyle III) 
(emphasis added). 
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For example, the U.S. Chamber Institute for Law Reform185 made 
assertions about the downside of nonlawyer ownership that were not 
only unsubstantiated, but so dubious on their face that they could 
only have been makeweights.  The Institute divined that firms with 
outside investors “would likely hurt client interests . . . because 
lawyers would be focused on attracting . . . nonlawyer investors rather 
than providing top-notch legal services,”186 and that such firms would 
be “likely to increase the cost of legal services and diminish access to 
justice because investors will expect substantial profits without adding 
much, if any, value to the quality (or efficiency) of the legal services 
being provided.”187  I would have thought, however, that firms that do 
not provide top-notch services would be at a disadvantage in finding 
outside investors,188 and that law firms would rarely seek outside 
equity investors unless they thought an infusion of equity capital 
would enable them to upgrade the quality and efficiency of their 
services or maintain financial stability.189 
On the other hand, Doug Richmond criticized the Working Group 
for failing to prove that “a material percentage of U.S. lawyers” 
would be interested in practicing with nonlawyer partners in firms 
meeting the requirements of the Draft Resolution.190  Referring to 
what the Working Group conceded was anecdotal evidence that small 
law firms in D.C. are “increasingly interested” in having nonlawyer 
partners,191 Richmond asserted that “[t]here is, of course, no such 
 
 185. See Comments of U.S. Chamber Inst. for Legal Reform, supra note 158.  The 
Institute is an arm of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.  It works to limit “litigation 
abuse.” Id. at 1. 
 186. Id. at 3. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Cf. THOMAS D. MORGAN, THE VANISHING AMERICAN LAWYER 170 (2010) 
(suggesting that if law firms were permitted to attract and retain outside investors, 
their interest in doing so might “impose financial and behavioral discipline on law 
firms whose members have not experienced serious pressure to exercise it” in the 
past). 
 189. A potential new benefit for law firms that obtain equity capital from outside 
investors rather than relying solely on debt financing came to light recently when the 
law firm Dewey & LeBoeuf was forced into bankruptcy by its lenders. See James R. 
Denlea, Rule Barring Nonlawyers from Investing Was Key, NAT’L L.J., June 18, 
2012, at 49, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id= 
1202559704812; Lawrence W. Newman & David Zaslowsky, In Wake of Dewey, 
Considering Alternative Business Structures, N.Y. L.J., June 1, 2012, at 4, available at 
http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/PubArticleNY.jsp?id=1202556659208. 
 190. Richmond Letter, supra note 158, at 1.  Mr. Richmond is a Managing Director 
with Aon Professional Services and a well-known consultant to law firms on issues of 
professional responsibility and malpractice liability. 
 191. ALPS Draft Resolution, supra note 17, at 2. 
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thing as ‘anecdotal evidence’ for purposes of any standard relevant to 
lawyers.”192 
Yet the Working Group also cited other evidence suggesting that a 
non-trivial number of U.S. lawyers might have such an interest in 
fairly short order if the Draft Resolution was widely adopted.  
Between 2009 and 2013, lawyers in England and Wales were  allowed 
to practice in Lawyer Disciplinary Practices (LDPs), i.e., law firms 
that have nonlawyer owners but must operate under virtually the 
same regulatory constraints the Working Group’s Draft Resolution 
would impose.193  The Draft Report cited data showing that, within 
two years, 218 law firms in England and Wales had taken on 
nonlawyer owners and registered as LDPs.194 
Calling the Working Group’s evidence of demand anecdotal is 
certainly fair.  But under the circumstances, insisting on more 
probative evidence is unrealistic.  The Working Group found it 
impossible to get more rigorous data on lawyer demand (i.e., lawyer 
interest in practicing law in firms with the form of nonlawyer 
ownership the Draft Resolution would permit), or virtually any useful 
information about potential client demand for the services such firms 
would offer.195 
 
 192. Richmond Letter, supra note 158, at 1.  Richmond fails to mention that the 
Working Group also learned that a number of law firms with offices in Washington, 
D.C. and other jurisdictions as well have expressed interest in having nonlawyer 
partners in their D.C. offices but felt that they could not take that step as long as 
those other jurisdictions continued to bar their lawyers from practicing in firms with 
nonlawyer owners. See ALPS Draft Resolution, supra note 17, at 10. 
 193. See ALPS Draft Resolution, supra note 17, at 8 & nn.18–22 (describing the 
regulatory restrictions on LDPs in England and Wales). 
 194. Id. at 9 & n.24 (citing data provided by the Solicitors Regulatory Authority, 
the regulatory arm of the Law Society of England and Wales).  The weight of this 
evidence is clouded, however, by the fact that LDPs will have to decide by 2013 
whether to revert to being traditional law firms without nonlawyer owners or, 
instead, become licensed “alternative business structures,” a much broader category 
that includes MDPs and law firms with outside investors. See id. at 9 n.25.  Richmond 
seems to think that the Draft Report mentioned LDPs solely to note that so far no 
problems with LDPs have been reported. Richmond Letter, supra note 158, at 4 
(suggesting that LDPs have been in operation so briefly that the lack of problems as 
of April 2011 is not meaningful).  In fact, however, the Draft Resolution cited the 
rapidly growing numbers of LDPs chiefly as evidence of lawyer interest. See ALPS 
Draft Resolution, supra note 17, at 9. 
 195. When released for comment, the ALPS Discussion Paper was accompanied by 
a cover memorandum from the Co-Chairs of the 20/20 Commission, which solicited 
comments on whether “there is demand [among lawyers or clients outside of 
Washington, D.C.] for firms with limited nonlawyer ownership of the sort the 
Working Group proposes.” Memorandum from Jamie S. Gorelick & Michael 
Traynor, Co-Chairs, ABA Comm’n on Ethics 20/20, to ABA Entities, Courts, Bar 
SCHNEYER_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE) 4/15/2013  5:46 PM 
2012] “PROFESSIONALISM” AS PATHOLOGY 127 
In any event, requiring rigorous evidence of lawyer and client 
interest in a practice structure that now exists only in small numbers 
in one jurisdiction strikes me as inappropriate.  After all, economists 
advised the MDP Commission that the only reliable way to gauge 
demand for MDPs was to permit them, at least provisionally, and see 
whether there “turns out to be a market.”196  Outside of Washington, 
D.C., this approach would presumably be necessary as well to gauge 
demand for D.C.-like law firms with nonlawyer owners. 
Besides, if such firms are permitted and lawyers prove to be 
uninterested, or if they are created and fail for lack of clients, there 
will be little opportunity for the profession’s core values to be 
compromised.  In any event, I doubt that those who opposed the 
Working Group’s proposal would think better of it if they were 
presented with reams of rigorous evidence of demand.197 
3. The Imperative to Ban Nonlawyer Ownership Categorically 
Rather than Permitting but Regulating a Modest Form of Nonlawyer 
Ownership 
As Part II noted since the Supreme Court struck down the ban on 
lawyer advertising198 and narrowed the ban on practicing law through 
intermediaries to permit lawyers to participate in GLS programs,199 
the dire consequences bar leaders had predicted if those categorical 
bans were relaxed have not materialized.  While some lawyers still 
 
Associations, Law Schools, and Individuals 3 (Dec. 2, 2011), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/20111202-
ethics2020-discussion_draft-alps.authcheckdam.pdf.  The Commission received 
virtually no responses about client demand for firms with such a limited form of 
nonlawyer ownership, which is hardly surprising because potential clients and 
consumer groups must have had little or no idea about the range, cost, and quality of 
the services such unfamiliar firms would offer.  Given the reasons why the 
Commission could not obtain more probative evidence of demand, it is hardly 
damning to learn that the New Jersey State Bar Association was “unaware of any 
outcry within the New Jersey bar, business community, or general public in [sic] 
allowing non-attorneys to acquire equity ownership in law firms, regardless of how 
limited.” Comments of NJSBA, supra note 158, at 1 (emphasis added). 
 196. ABA COMM’N ON MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE, supra note 108; see also 
supra notes 116–17 and accompanying text. 
 197. Cf. Rogers, supra note 158, at 2 (reporting on an exchange at a 20/20 
Commission meeting between Commissioner Stephen Gillers and attorney Larry 
Fox, who opposes nonlawyer ownership).  In response to a question from Professor 
Gillers, Mr. Fox acknowledged that, at least in his case, such evidence would fall on 
deaf ears. Id. 
 198. See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977). 
 199. See sources cited supra note 76. 
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find lawyer advertising undignified, the bar obviously has come to 
accept truthful lawyer advertising and participation in GLS programs.  
But in the case of nonlawyer ownership, courts have not (yet) struck 
down or significantly narrowed the ban.  And judging by the 
comments the Commission received on the issue, the impulse to 
maintain that ban remains strong.  The comments of nine general 
counsel at major corporations are a case in point:  
[T]he experience of countries such as Australia illustrates that the 
impulse to start relaxing the longstanding rules upon which the legal 
profession has been built can quickly lead to a radical 
transformation of the practice of law.  The experience suggests that 
allowing non-lawyers control over law firms—even if only in small 
measure—will pave the way for a fundamental reworking of the 
profession.  The far better course is to refuse to open the door to 
non-lawyer ownership even a crack.  The argument for a clean rule 
against non-lawyer ownership rests on . . . principle.  Permitting 
even a limited form of non-lawyer ownership transforms the debate 
from a matter of principle to a matter of degree and creates a built-
in constituency in favor of further change.  The ABA should resist 
this pernicious trend at the outset.  After all, the role of the ABA is 
to strengthen the practice of law as a profession, not to erode its 
foundations by weakening its very commitment to 
professionalism.200 
In fact, however, knowledgeable observers have suggested that 
MDPs and outside investment in law firms do pose greater risks than 
the limited form of nonlawyer ownership that is permitted in 
Washington D.C.,201 let alone the more limited form the Working 
Group’s proposal would permit.  And the nine general counsel seem 
to agree, for they acknowledge that that proposal “may pose less risk 
of outside [i.e., nonlawyer] influence” than the MDP Commission’s 
proposals.202  But permitting one arrangement while prohibiting 
another that carries more risk need not be unprincipled.  The 20/20 
Commission found “fundamental principles” including the 
profession’s core values relevant when it made early decisions not to 
consider lifting the ban on MDPs and outside investment, but 
continued to consider a more modest proposal.203  And, if adopting 
 
 200. Comments of Nine General Counsel, supra note 158, at 10 (emphasis added). 
 201. See, e.g., Susan Gilbert & Larry Lempert, The Nonlawyer Partner: Moderate 
Proposals Deserve a Chance, 2 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 383, 392–400 (1988). 
 202. Comments of Nine General Counsel, supra note 158, at 7 (emphasis added). 
 203. See ALPS Draft Resolution, supra note 17, at 2 (stating that the Commission 
was guided by “fundamental principles” (including the profession’s core values) in 
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the Working Group’s Draft Resolution would have meant that there 
would no longer be any principled basis for opposing MDPs or 
passive investment in law firms, one might suppose that two decades 
of trouble-free (albeit limited) experience with a similarly 
circumscribed form of nonlawyer ownership in Washington, D.C. 
would by now have led to further liberalization there. 
4. The Slippery Slope Theory 
The opponents’ comments invoke the slippery slope theory to 
argue that, even if adopting the Working Group’s proposal would not 
be objectionable in itself, it would allow the proverbial camel to get 
its nose under the professional tent.  Arguments premised on the 
slippery slope theory are a subset of arguments for maintaining a 
categorical ban on nonlawyer ownership, and need little separate 
discussion.  But it is worth mentioning Doug Richmond’s curious 
variation on the theme. 
Richmond asserts that “there is a camel, it has a nose, and [the 
Commission is] leading it to the profession’s tent while disclaiming 
such intent.”204  The twist lies in how he thinks the slippery slope 
phenomenon would play out.  Richmond fears that if the Working 
Group’s proposal is adopted, it might not spawn any problems!205  In 
that unfortunate case, “[w]hen the outside investment and MDP 
proponents resurface those proposals—and they will—they continue 
to beat those drums now—they will say . . . ‘See, the Ethics 20/20 
Commission’s change to Model Rule 5.4 spawned no problems, and 
our proposals merely build upon that secure foundation.’”206 
Now, perhaps this would happen.  If states began to adopt the 
Working Group’s proposal, the Washington, D.C. experience 
suggests that they would encounter few, if any, ethical problems.  Let 
us assume with Richmond that this would embolden proponents of 
MDPs and outside investment in law firms to come forward with new 
proposals.  But what if it did?  Surely, Richmond and other strong 
advocates for holding the line would be prepared to challenge those 
proposals by distinguishing them from the Working Group’s 
proposal. 
 
deciding not to consider recommending publicly-traded law firms, other forms of 
passive investment in law firms, or MDPs). 
   204.  Richmond Letter, supra note 158, at 5. 
 205. See id. at 4–5 
   206. Id. 
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For his part, Larry Fox finessed the slippery slope argument 
altogether, by directly accusing the Commission (not the ALPS 
Working Group, which would have been more appropriate) of 
“launching a new MDP assault on Rule 5.4.”  “Of course,” Fox 
added, “they don’t call it that.  They have invented a new name 
[ALPS], but trust me; this is really the same wine in the same bottles, 
with a new label.”207 
5. Unsubstantiated Concerns that Nonlawyer Ownership Will 
“Compromise Core Values” 
For many lawyers, the profession’s core values are the heart of 
lawyer professionalism.  Consequently, many of the comments 
opposing the Working Group’s proposal expressed concerns that, by 
allowing even a very limited form of nonlawyer ownership, the 
proposal would compromise core values.208 
 
 207. Fox, supra note 158, at 2.  Fox “reasoned” to this conclusion by asking what 
sorts of nonlawyers would become law firm partners under the proposal.  Those 
nonlawyers might commonly include IT professionals; law firm administrators; 
scientists and engineers in intellectual property firms; social workers and financial 
planners in family law firms; or nurses and investigators in personal injury firms, Fox 
seized on a more exotic example—architects. See id.  Next, though presumably aware 
that the Draft Resolution limits nonlawyer partners to assisting lawyers in providing 
legal services, see MODEL CODE OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4(b)(1),(2) (2012); ALPS 
Draft Resolution, supra note 17, Fox asks, “If an architect is involved in the practice 
of law, is that not UPL?” Fox, supra note 158, at 2.  (The right answer would 
ordinarily be, no, it is not UPL for an architect to work under a lawyer’s supervision 
to help her develop a rationale to support a client’s request for a zoning variance or 
draft or interpret a client’s construction contract.)  Next, Fox asserts that if the 
architect is not involved in the practice of law, “she must be . . . designing buildings 
[which is] a multi-disciplinary activity.” Id.  In my opinion, this argument is absurd 
and grossly mischaracterizes the Working Group’s Draft Resolution.  If Fox’s 
characterization were apt, then law firms with nonlawyer owners in Washington, D.C. 
would presumably be operating unethically, as de facto MDPs.  And competing law 
firms without nonlawyer partners would have reason to complain to disciplinary 
authorities, as they have not. See Rogers, supra note 166, at 383 (providing 
information supplied by D.C. bar counsel).  In the same submission, Fox disdainfully 
referred to the nonlawyer professionals who are or might become law firm owners 
under the proposal as “trades-people infecting law firms.” Fox, supra note 158, at 2. 
 208. Allowing for minor variations in terminology, there is at least a rough 
consensus that those values include competence, confidentiality, loyalty (avoidance 
of conflicts), independent professional judgment, and the preservation of professional 
self-regulation. See supra note 9.  Many accounts also include promoting access to 
justice. 
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Examples include concerns that nonlawyer ownership will (a) put 
the attorney-client privilege at risk (confidentiality);209 (b) weaken the 
profession’s commitment to pro bono work, which increases access to 
justice;210 (c) promote conflicts of interest by introducing “mixed 
motives” into law firm decisions,211 yet, at the same time, somehow 
accelerate a tendency that already exists among lawyers to “chase 
after higher profits;”212 (d) revive the use of “runners” to drum up 
business;213 (e) increase the likelihood of external regulation and 
 
 209. See Fox, supra note 158, at 4 (stating that the Working Group’s proposal “will 
compromise the availability of the privilege for the clients of the MDP” (emphasis 
added).  If a firm asserts that its “non-lawyer architects were merely engaged in the . . 
. practice of law . . . a court is even less likely to buy that proposition . . . than they 
[sic] buy the proposition that . . . [an] Assistant General Counsel (who is at least a 
lawyer) is entitled to the privilege when she is wearing a business hat.” Id.; see also 
Comments of Nine General Counsel, supra note 158, at 4 (“[T]he addition of 
nonlawyer partners to law firms creates . . . uncertainty about which aspects of a non-
lawyer’s advice to a client are . . . privileged.”).  This concern is largely unwarranted.  
Communications between a lawyer or her clients, on one hand, and, on the other, a 
nonlawyer whom the lawyer employed or retained to assist her in providing legal 
services to those clients, are privileged. See, e.g., United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 
918, 921 (2d Cir. 1961).  There is no reason for nonlawyer partners to be treated 
differently. See also THE ATTORNEY CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN CIVIL LITIGATION 629 
(Vincent S. Walkowiak ed., 4th ed. 2008) (“It is generally accepted that a consultant . 
. . may communicate with the client or with the attorney without destroying the 
attorney-client privilege, if the communications are made on behalf of the client to 
obtain legal advice. . . .  [T]he general rule that a client’s disclosure of confidential 
communications . . . destroys the attorney-client privilege does not apply when the 
disclosure is made to third parties who assist an attorney in rendering legal advice.”). 
 210. See Comments of NYSBA Comm., supra note 158, at 4 (stating that the legal 
profession is committed to increasing access to legal services through pro bono work, 
but “[o]ther professions may not necessarily share this commitment”). 
 211. See Comments of Nine General Counsel, supra note 158, at 5 (“[Non-lawyer 
ownership] changes a firm from a group of like-minded attorneys zealously pursuing 
their clients’ interests, into a group with inherently mixed motives . . . .  It is not hard 
to imagine that non-lawyer partners might place considerations of economic gain 
ahead of a client’s interests.”). 
 212. Id. at 4.  But insofar as business interests are already influencing law firms that 
have no nonlawyer partners, one could just as well speculate that the marginal 
contribution to that trend by nonlawyer owners in a law firm operating under the 
restrictions in the Working Group’s proposal would be a drop in the bucket.  Besides, 
Julius Henry Cohen’s animus against business values in law practice notwithstanding, 
the business impulse to improve law firm efficiency and management, especially risk 
management, is not self-evidently bad for clients. See Christine Parker et al., 
Regulating Law Firm Ethics Management: An Empirical Assessment of an 
Innovation in Regulation of the Legal Profession in New South Wales, 37 J.L. & 
SOC’Y 466 (2010). 
 213. See Fox, supra note 158, at 4–5 (“One of the darkest chapters in our 
profession’s history featured the wholesale use of runners—ambulance chasers—who 
would show up at . . . hospital bedsides to sign up potential plaintiffs for a share of the 
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jeopardize self-regulation,214 and even (f) “facilitate the destruction of 
the independence and core values of the legal profession and 
ultimately the judicial branch of government.”215 
Just how unsubstantiated assertions that nonlawyer ownership will 
compromise core values have “worked” over time in bar debates 
about the ethics rules that should govern nonlawyer ownership is a bit 
of a mystery.  My impression is that many lawyers regard the core 
values as “core” not just in the sense that they are important, but in 
the further sense that they are sacrosanct.  Sacrosanct values are often 
viewed as absolute values brooking no compromise.  Consequently, a 
lawyer who regards the ability to exercise independent professional 
judgment on behalf of clients as an absolute value may oppose any 
proposal to relax the categorical ban on nonlawyer ownership simply 
because those who advocate maintaining that ban assert that 
nonlawyer ownership will “compromise” that core value or put it “at 
risk.”  Yet neither the advocates nor the lawyer may have any idea 
about the probability that such an ill-defined risk will materialize or 
the gravity of the harm that will result if it does.  In short, whether a 
highly circumscribed form of nonlawyer ownership of law firms will 
“compromise” the core value of independent professional judgment 
sounds like an empirical question, but for ardent opponents of 
 
lawyer’s contingent fee.  And now, with the ability to share fees with non-lawyer 
runners, we can expect this practice to thrive once again.”); see also J. Leeds Barroll, 
in COMMENTS: UNIFORMITY, CHOICE OF LAW AND CONFLICTS OF INTEREST WORKING 
GROUP, DISCUSSION DRAFT ON ALTERNATIVE LAW PRACTICE STRUCTURES 4 (2012), 
available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/20111219-
alps_comments_all.authcheckdam.pdf (calling the Draft Resolution “nothing but a 
subterfuge to legalize runners and to institutionalize the paying of referral fees”).  
The glaring weakness in these assertions is that, although the Draft Resolution would 
permit lawyers to share legal fees with nonlawyer partners (under restricted 
conditions), direct contact with prospective clients to solicit their business remains an 
ethical violation, see MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 7.3(a) (2012), as does 
violating or attempting to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct through the acts 
of another.” Id. R. 8.4(a). 
 214. Some opponents of the Draft Resolution base this claim on the fact that 
nonlawyer owners of law firms would not be subject to professional discipline. See, 
e.g., Comments of Nine General Counsel, supra note 158, at 4.  But as agents and 
fiduciaries of firm clients, nonlawyer owners, like their lawyer counterparts, would 
owe clients duties of confidentiality, loyalty, and care and be subject to civil liability 
for breaching those duties.  Under the proposal, lawyer partners would also have a 
duty to ensure that nonlawyer partners behave in a manner that is consistent with 
lawyers’ ethical duties, just as they have a duty to supervise their nonlawyer 
employees, who are also outside the jurisdiction of lawyer disciplinary agencies. See 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.3 (2012). 
 215. Thies Letter, supra note 158, at 4. 
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nonlawyer ownership in any form, it is not.  For them, it is a rhetorical 
question. 
6. Any Suggestion that Allowing Law Firms to Have Nonlawyer 
Owners Might Promote Competition in the Legal Services Market Is 
Out of Bounds 
Since Cohen’s day, promoting competition in legal services, far 
from being a core value of the American legal profession, has been a 
negative value.216  But one sentence in the Draft Report supporting 
the ALPS Working Group’s proposal went against the grain by 
suggesting that promoting competition in legal services might have 
redeeming social value.  “[I]n the absence of empirical evidence from 
the District of Columbia or elsewhere that lawyers cannot meet their 
professional obligations in any firm that has even a single nonlawyer 
owner,” the Report stated, “there is no clear justification for 
protecting lawyers in traditional law firms from having to compete 
with lawyers who believe that the kind of alternative law practice 
structures the Resolution would permit can improve client service.”217  
This sentence did not go unnoticed by opponents of the proposal.  
Doug Richmond responded that the sentence “makes no sense at all 
unless someone is advocating change for the sake of it.”218  
“Certainly,” he added, “fostering competition between domestic law 
 
 216. For the profession’s anti-competitive justifications for minimum fee schedules, 
see supra notes 83–84.  For a discussion on the Arizona State Bar’s effort to justify its 
ban on lawyer advertising by arguing before the Supreme Court that the “hustle” of 
an ad-infused “marketplace” for legal services would have grave consequences for 
client confidence and lawyers’ sense of professionalism, see supra text accompanying 
note 92. 
 217. ALPS Draft Resolution, supra note 17, at 3.  This sentence also went against 
the grain in that it was at odds with the opponents’ insistence that the “burden of 
proof” in the ALPS debate fall on the proponents of the Working Group’s proposal.  
Mr. Richmond found “most curious . . . the Working Group’s complete bypass of the 
obvious converse position, i.e., in the absence of empirical evidence that clients 
require alternatively-structured law firms for their legal needs to be met, there is no 
reason to alter the widely accepted status quo.”  Richmond Letter, supra note 158, at 
3.  It is true that the Working Group was unable to provide substantial evidence of 
client demand.  But although the “status quo”—the categorical ban—may still be 
widely accepted in the bar, I am far from certain that the American public, fully 
informed on the issue, would, or should, agree.  Although Richmond is right that 
there are two competing ways of assigning the burden of proof in the ALPS debates, 
wide acceptance of the status quo within the bar does not strike me as a dispositive 
reason to accept Richmond’s assignment. 
 218. Id. 
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firms cannot be part of the Commission’s charge.”219  But why not?  
Nothing in the Commission’s charge ruled out that consideration.220 
III.  TWO PROBLEMS WITH CONTINUING TO TREAT THE IDIOM OF 
PROFESSIONALISM AS THE “OFFICIAL LANGUAGE” FOR THE 
BAR’S POLICY DEBATES ON THE RULES THAT SHOULD GOVERN 
LAWYERS’ BUSINESS ENTANGLEMENTS 
In tracing the development of the idiom of professionalism from 
Julius Henry Cohen’s day up to the 20/20 Commission’s ALPS 
debate, Part I identified the idiom-based arguments that served, 
within the bar, to justify minimum fee schedules and bans on lawyer 
 
 219. Id.  Richmond also objected to the reference in the same sentence to 
“improving client service.” “[I]mproving client service in this context would be an 
odd charge for the Commission,” he wrote, “because ‘client service’ . . .  (as 
distinguished from duties of diligence or communication, which have . . . ethical 
bases) is a pure practice management issue traditionally and rightly left to individual 
lawyers and law firms.” Id.  But practice management itself has become a matter of 
ethical concern. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.1(a) (2009) 
(requiring law firm partners to “make reasonable efforts to ensure that the[ir] firm 
has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that [the firm’s lawyers] conform 
to the Rules of Professional Conduct”). See generally Ted Schneyer, On Further 
Reflection: How “Professional Self-Regulation Should Promote Compliance with 
Broad Ethical Duties of Law Firm Management, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 577 (2011).  In 
recent years, Australia and the United Kingdom have both made the proactive 
regulation of law firm management a central part of their regulatory program.  For a 
brief discussion of “management-based proactive regulation” in New South Wales, 
see id. at 620–26. 
 220. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.  On the contrary, when President 
Lamm created the Commission in 2009, she expected it to review the Model Rules 
“as well as other developments in . . . lawyer regulation, including . . . changes in how 
other countries regulate lawyers.” “I don’t think,” she said, that “the U.S. legal 
profession is in a position [to] ignore what’s going on worldwide.” See James 
Podgers, Firm Hand for Hard Times, A.B.A. J., Aug. 2009, at 63, 64.  And what is 
“going on” in the United Kingdom is the recognition that promoting competition in 
legal services is an appropriate regulatory objective. See Legal Services Act, 2007 c. 
29, § 11(e), (U.K.), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2007/29/part/1 
(listing the “promoti[on] [of] competition in the provision of [legal] services” as one 
of eight overarching regulatory objectives).  In a recent article, Professor Laurel 
Terry, Steve Mark (the Legal Services Commissioner for New South Wales), and 
Tahlia Gordon (the Director of Research in Mr. Mark’s office) conclude on the basis 
of “many antitrust studies of the legal profession” that increased competition in legal 
services is desirable, not for its own sake, but because it is likely to improve access to 
justice.  They also see great value in official statements of regulatory objectives, 
though they do not think increasing competition must be on the list, because those 
words are incendiary and a reference to the ultimate objective of improving access to 
justice should suffice to make the point. See Laurel S. Terry et al., Adopting 
Regulatory Objectives for the Legal Profession, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2685, 2737–38 
(2012). 
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advertising and participation in GLS plans, but ultimately failed to 
survive Supreme Court scrutiny.  Part II criticized the very similar 
arguments that showed up repeatedly in submissions to the 20/20 
Commission from opponents of a proposal to narrow the ban on 
nonlawyer ownership of law practices by permitting lawyers to 
practice in law firms that have an extremely limited form of 
nonlawyer ownership. 
From this analysis, I conclude that heavy and repeated reliance on 
idiom-based arguments to win the day in bar debates on the business 
aspects of law practice poses two problems that bar leaders may not 
fully appreciate. 
The first problem is that idiom-based arguments, which are value-
laden but often devoid of factual support, may well be displacing 
more difficult, evidence-based assessments of the risks and benefits, 
or the likely impact, of a proposed rule—assessments that at least 
sometimes should be considered necessary before deciding whether 
to adopt or reject the rule.221  For that reason, idiom-based arguments 
may beget ill-considered rules.  Moreover, the fact that idiom-based 
arguments tend to be unsupported by empirical evidence may 
undermine the ABA’s status as the primary source of ethics rules for 
law practice in another way.  Legal scholars increasingly regard as 
fatuous regulatory policies based on factually ungrounded arguments 
such as an argument that nonlawyer ownership must be categorically 
banned because of the “concern” that it will or might “compromise 
core values” or “put them at risk.”222  Such arguments fuel scholarly 
 
 221. It would be naïve, however, to suppose that reliable, evidence-based 
assessments are always, or even mostly, possible in the domain of lawyer regulation.  
Laurel Terry and her colleagues recently pointed out that although some 
governments may insist that legal regulators “must have empirical evidence justifying 
[a] proposed rule or restriction” before they act, and this “empiricism principle . . . 
makes sense in some contexts (such as prescription drug approvals), [the principle 
may not be] appropriate . . . for legal profession regulation where it may be difficult 
to measure ex ante the impact of regulatory changes on objectives such as 
[furthering] the public interest.” Terry et al., supra note 220, at 2740 & n.277.  While 
this point is well taken, it would not follow that a proposal to allow some form of 
nonlawyer ownership must be rejected unless and until there is substantial evidence 
that its benefits will exceed its costs.  The wiser course may be to adopt the rule, 
perhaps provisionally, with the understanding that its effects will be monitored.  
Unfortunately, systematic study of the impact of ethics rules has never been a feature 
of professional self-regulation in the United States, as it increasingly is elsewhere. See 
Parker et al., supra note 212; Terry et al., supra note 220, at 2692 nn.27–52. 
 222. See, e.g., THOMAS D. MORGAN, THE VANISHING AMERICAN LAWYER 68–69 
(2010) (deriding the “preposterous” claims of professional rhetoric); Edward S. 
Adams & John H. Matheson, Law Firms on the Big Board: A Proposal for 
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doubts that the bar can make appropriate rules on such subjects.223  
Even within the bar such arguments against nonlawyer ownership 
may lose their cachet over time if, as I predict, more lawyers come to 
see nonlawyer ownership as attractive.224  Meanwhile, however, we 
will have missed the opportunity to learn from experience which, if 
any, forms of nonlawyer ownership cause problems and how best to 
regulate firms with nonlawyer owners. 
The second problem that arises when rules banning lawyer 
entanglements with business are idiom-based and have no empirical 
support is that they have proven to be vulnerable to legal challenge 
on constitutional or antitrust grounds.  This problem is certainly not 
going away.  Indeed, it is no longer fanciful to suppose that 
categorical bans on nonlawyer ownership will be struck down on 
constitutional grounds in the foreseeable future,225 or that state 
legislatures will try to override the bans by statute.226 
 
Nonlawyer Investment in Law Firms, 86 CAL. L. REV. 1, 40 (1998) (dismissing 
arguments against corporate ownership of law practices, such as “fear of corporate 
giants, interference with professional independence . . . unauthorized practice of law, 
and the danger of the legal profession becoming too businesslike”). 
 223. Cf. Rob Atkinson, A Dissenter’s Commentary on the Professionalism 
Crusade, 74 TEX. L. REV. 259, 263 (1995) (challenging the bar’s professionalism 
movement on the ground that it rests on an implicit assumption that there is a single, 
universal way to be a legal professional, which categorically condemns a broad range 
of activities even if some of them would be completely benign). 
 224. This scenario may have been prefigured by the “revolt” that led to ABA 
repeal of a ban on law firms owning and operating ancillary businesses in favor of a 
regulatory approach. See supra Part I.C.3. 
 225. In May 2011, Jacoby & Meyers, a plaintiffs’ personal injury firm, filed nearly 
identical lawsuits challenging on various constitutional grounds the bans on 
nonlawyer ownership in New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut. See Mark 
Hamblett, Suit Challenges N.Y. Prohibition on Non-Lawyer Firm Ownership, N.Y. 
L.J., May 20, 2011, at 1, available at http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/ 
PubArticleNY.jsp?id=1202494645339 (describing the suits as claiming that the ban on 
nonlawyer investment “denies law firms the ability to raise outside capital, [thereby] 
denying most lawyers a critical source of funding [and] dramatically imped[ing] 
access to legal services for those otherwise unable to afford them”).  In November 
2012, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that Jacoby & Meyers 
could amend its complaint challenging the New York ethics rule banning nonlawyer 
ownership in order to challenge New York statutes that also prevent nonlawyer 
ownership, and could resubmit the claim to the federal district court. See Jacoby & 
Meyers, LLP v. Presiding Justices of the First, Second, Third and Fourth Dep’ts, 
App. Div. of the Sup. Ct. of the State of N.Y., 488 F. App’x 526 (2d Cir. 2012); Scott, 
Jacoby & Meyers to Bring Amended Lawsuit Over Non-lawyer Ownership, JD J. 
(Nov. 22, 2012), http://www.jdjournal.com/2012/11/22/jacoby-meyers-to-bring-
amended-lawsuit-over-non-lawyer-ownership/; see also Renee Newman Knake, 
Democratizing the Delivery of Legal Services, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 8 (2012) (“In light 
of precedent extending over half a century, the blanket suppression of corporate law 
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CONCLUSION 
As co-chair of the ALPS Working Group, I was disappointed that 
the 20/20 Commission decided not to recommend our proposal for 
adoption by the ABA House of Delegates.  Our Draft Resolution and 
Draft Report remain in the ABA archives, but no relaxation of the 
ban on nonlawyer ownership of law firms by the ABA or state-
supreme courts seems likely in the short term—unless, of course, the 
ban is struck down in litigation.227 
This Article does not try to make the case for nonlawyer ownership 
as a matter of public policy.  Instead, it criticizes in rhetorical terms 
the input the 20/20 Commission received from lawyers and bar 
entities who opposed the Working Group’s narrow proposal and 
nonlawyer ownership generally.  The Article shows that the input 
relies heavily—often exclusively—on arguments couched in what I 
call the idiom of professionalism.  It shows that the same arguments 
have been invoked repeatedly since Julius Henry Cohen’s day to 
support bans on various lawyer “entanglements with business.”  And, 
judging by the frequent failure of those arguments to withstand 
judicial scrutiny in recent decades when those bans were attacked on 
constitutional or antitrust grounds, this Article suggests that the 
arguments have become threadbare and do no honor to the tradition 
of professional self-regulation. 
Stephen Gillers, my colleague on the 20/20 Commission, recently 
put my concern in useful perspective.  After stating that “[t]he 
traditional model of lawyer regulation cannot expect to police this 
new world” of law practice, and asking what “enlightened regulators” 
should do about it, he ventured the following answer: 
[O]ne argument must be immediately repudiated: that if we do 
anything that recognizes these changes, we afford a patina of 
legitimacy at the expense of the American legal profession’s core 
values . . . .  Not only is that claim false, I argue that the opposite is 
 
practice ownership must give way to the First Amendment rights of corporations, 
lawyers, and individuals associated with the delivery of legal services.”). 
 226. A bill was introduced in the North Carolina General Assembly during the 
2011 session that would have permitted “nonattorney ownership of professional 
corporation law firms, subject to certain requirements.” S254, 2011 Gen. Assemb., 
Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2011). 
 227. An analogy: the House of Delegates resolution shutting down the MDP 
Commission in 2000 brought a halt to consideration of whether to allow MDPs in the 
states, some of which had previously shown considerable interest in the idea. See 
Mona L. Hymel, Multidisciplinary Practices: Where Are They? What Happened?, 
103 TAX NOTES 689 (2004). 
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true.  Doing nothing threatens these values because by ignoring the 
accelerating changes at play, we fail to regulate against the abuses 
these changes may bring . . . .  To put it another way, the cry we must 
heed is not for less regulation of the profession, but rather for new 
regulation of the burgeoning ways that legal services are sold.  That 
these changes bring with them new forms of competition with 
established distribution channels and the lawyers who populate 
them, and that they undoubtedly lead to financial disappointment 
and professional dislocation for many lawyers while empowering 
others and offering possible benefits to clients in the form of lower 
costs and greater efficiency, seems indisputable.  It is not a trend, I 
submit, that we can vote down.  Indeed, insofar as the changes make 
legal services more accessible and affordable while protecting core 
values, our social responsibility requires us to welcome them.  But if 
the illusion that we can stop the changes leads to inaction, we do 
threaten the very core values we claim to protect.228 
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